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Last April in Boston, Massachusetts the National Association of
Student Personnel Administrators held their 52nd Annual Conference.
The central theme of the conference, "Conflict and Change in the
Academic Community," struck us as being especially relevant to the
concerns of our readers, and two of the papers in particular impressed
us as being unusually germane to our committment to General/
Liberal studies and the improvement of undergraduate education.
We are, therefore, reprinting those two papers in this issue of
Perspectives, with the kind permission of the writers-Dr. Sidney
Hook and Dr. Harris L. Wofford, Jr.
Since both Dr. Hook and Dr. Wofford arc raising questions about
"the direction of change" in our universities and colleges, we thought
it equally appropriate to include papers that raise similar questions
about more specific "directions of change." Dr. Claude S. Phillips, Jr.
raises questions about the direction of the social sciences in the 1970's.
And Dr. Franklin G. Fisk raises questions about the direction of
science.
The other paper in this issue, "The Course Curse," was included
because the writer, Dr. Dale Porter, questions whether the academic
community will in fact raise the right kinds of questions about change.
The Editor
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Conflict and Change 1n the
Academic Community
By

SmNEY

HooK

Among the current myths that circulate about the American college
and university is the view that they have been very conservative
institutions, hostile to educational change and cloistured off from
the tumults and troubles of the ma rket place. On the basis of my
own experience as student, teacher, and administrator, covering a
time-span of more than a half-century, I can testify to the injustice
a nd inaccuracy of such a characterization. Much of that period has
been spent, together with colleagues, in prolonged and agonizing
reappraisals of the objectives of higher education, particularly liberal
a rts education, and the refashioning of the curriculum of studies to
achieve these objectives. The very diversity of our institutions with
respect to m ethods, content, requirements and standards of instruction
is weighty evidence of the experimental nature of American education,
and its sensitiveness to a wide variety of educational needs. From the
multi-versity to the denominational college all are in need of educational improvement. The present ferment within them may provide
the occasion for accelerated change and continued improvement but
only if we do not assume that every change is ipso facto an improvement. Institutions like human beings change for better or worse.
At the same time during the last half-century the governance of
universities and colleges has on the whole been transformed from
administra tive absolutisms with respect to educational issues to academic communities in which faculties possess preponderant powers if
and when they choose to exercise them. Although the structure, legal
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and otherwise, of our colleges and universities is today in debate and
in transition, the proper resolutions of this a nd allied problems seems
to me to be clearly dependent upon the prior determina tion of what
the educational function or goal of the institution should be.
The history of American higher education, then, shows no hostility
to change. The all-important question tod ay is how changes are to be
effected- by coercion or the threat of coercion or by reflective discussion and debate. Unfortunately, there is a wide-spread tendancy
to introduce reforms not in the light of a considered analysis of basic
issues but in terms of what will restore order and prevent further
physical disruption of the campus-as if this were the primary criterion of what the best higher education for modern man should be,
as if the absence of physical turbulence-the freedom from arson,
bombings, violent confronta tion--could be anything more than a
necessary condition for the lo cus of a liberal educational experience.
I have been a life-long critic of American higher education mainly
on the ground of its deficiencies as an instrument of liberal education
whose ideals I regard as perennially valid. (The "perennial" must
not be confused with the "eternal") . In my Education for M odern
Man I have offered a program of positive reconstruction of the
college curriculum along the lines of John Dewey's educational philosophy whose validity seems to me more apparent today than when it
was originally published.
Before addressing myself to current challenges to the ideals of a
liberal education, I wish to take sharp issue with those who confidently
assert tha t today's graduates are better educated than their predecessors. If the perduring quality of the liberally educated mind is the
pursuit of freedom through the a rts of intelligence, then by and large
we must frankly recognize that liberal arts education has failed dism ally. When arson, obscenity, violence, confronta tions, classroom
disruptions and hooliganism, and cognate activities are present, the
legacy of liberal education is absent. Nonetheless, I find it significant
that some apologists for radical student activism should contend that
despite the means that it employs, this movement is designed to reinsta te the t raditional values of liberal arts education betrayed by its
faithless faculty servitors. This reminds me of nothing so much as
the contention of advocates of almost totalitarian philosophies that
d espite their dictatorial means they are "really" committed to democracy in a " higher" or "truer" sense.
By a liberal arts education I mean an education whose curriculum
has been designed to help students develop those powers a nd resources
- intellectual, emotional, cultural- that will enable them to acquire
in a greater or lesser measure :
( 1) a perspective on the events of their time with which to
meet the challenges of present and future experience

58

(2) a constella tion of values or a set of meanings or a calling or
a developing center a round which to organize their lives
( 3 ) the knowledge, ideals, and techniques n ecessary for them
adequately to perform their duties as free citizens of a free society
( 4 ) a cultiva ted sensibility and inner landscape so that they can
live a rich and significant personal life in a continuous process of
self-education .
These are generic ideals whose connota tions embrace an indeterminable number of special and temporal goals. It should be quite
clear tha t the comm itment to a liberal a rts education does not entail
a single and fixed curriculum for everyone. On the contrary: just
as the ideal or pursuit of health is compa rable with quite different
regimens of hygiene and diet for different individuals, so a liberal
a rts education will h ave not only an historically varied content as
society becomes more and more complex but will be reached by
varied pa ths reflecting the experience, capacity, needs a nd interests
of the student.
T od ay this conception of a liberal arts education, which I regard
as a basis and sometimes an accompaniment of all higher professional
education, is under a ttack from many different qua rters. I wish to
consider some of them .
The fi rs t of the m any threats to liberal education is the popula r
view tha t the curriculum of our colleges should be oriented to meeting
the crises that periodically a rise in society, tha t threaten to set the
world afl ame or to imperil our na tional survival or health of the
econom y. Th is crisis-oriented approach to education assumes that
the course of liberal study can and should be so organized tha t we
can win a wa r or end it, p revent recessions or infla tions, extend civil
rights, rebuild our ghettoes, stop the popula tion explosion, prevent
pollution- wha tever may be the "good cause" which we as citizens
rightfully deem to h ave overwhelming priority a t the moment.
In view of the extent to which the colleges and universities of
the country have responded to appeals to gear their curriculuar offerings to special situations and emergencies, the complaint that institutions of higher education have been academic cloistures and ivory
towers, uninvolved and unconcerned with the troubled fat e of man
a nd society, borders on the grotesque. It is typical of the looseness
and irresponsibility of much of the writing about the state of American
higher education today. If anything there is a greater need of ivory
towers for competent persons who wish to live in them, especially
when we recall the great benefits to mankind from those who have
inhabi ted them in the past. Even practical effects a re best achieved
by indi rection. On any but the most philistine conception of human
culture, the larger community has an ever p resent need fo r its seers,
p rophets and lonely men of vision who sometimes seem m addeningly
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irrelevant to the intellectual and social fashions of the moment. We
cannot breed such men but we should not prevent them from functioning by denigrating them or depriving them of a hospitable environment. They are all too rare under the best of conditions.
It is one thing to aim to develop through curricula r means the
a ttitudes and capacities necessary to think and act intelligently in
periods of crisis. It is quite another thing to believe that the special
knowledge a nd skills required for the m astery of specific crises can be
acquired in advance of their a ppearance. It is one thing to plan a
curriculum of studies with an awa reness of the social trends a nd
problems that are shaping the future and that are certain to affect
the lives of generations to come. It is simply Utopian in the bad sense
of the term, i.e. unrealistic and self-defeating, to imagine that a curriculum must necessarily keep up with all the specific trends a nd
ch anges that are cried up as important in the great news media, that
often emerge into and fade out of public consciousness with bewildering
suddenness. It is one thing to develop a readiness of response, an
ability to move promptly and intelligently in grappling with successive problems. It is quite something else to become petrified in a
specific posture, however excellent it m ay have been with respect to
some previous complex of problems.
This particular m yth tha t colleges and universities can ant1c1pate
through curricula r p anaceas, the specific crises ·of the future and help
m aster them, not to speak of crises of the present, overlooks the most
p atent truths about the history of past crises and of the kind of social
action necessary to resolve them. It is a myth which h as been attributed with some justification to modernists who have invoked Dewey's
name but have either not read or not properly understood him.
The opposite of a m yth, however, can be just as mythical. Some
traditionalists argue, in contradistinction to the above, that the best
preparation for social change is the immersion in a fixed curriculum
or program of studies. For example, Robert Hutchins writes: "if one
neglects history in favo r of current affairs, first he will n ever know
history, and second he will not understand current affairs." (O scar
Wilde put this more felicitously a long time ago when he wrote: "H e
to whom the present is the only thing tha t is present, knows nothing
of the age in which he lives.") We should applaud this recognition
of the value of knowledge of history and the plea for its intelligent
study. But then Hutchins goes on to add: "The part of the schools
is not to expedite current affairs but to initia te students into timeless
affairs." One cannot help asking: How can the study of timeless affairs help us to understand historical affairs which by definition are
not timeless? Surely there is a distinction between the enduri ng which
is part of historical existence, a nd the timeless!
An intelligent modernity does not require that we redraw the

60

maps of learning each year or decade or even generation at every
level. The p ast, even interpreta tions of the past, do not change that
much. Intelligent revisions and adaptations of the curriculum are
always in order, and if better methods and techniques of learning and
teaching a re available, let us employ them as· soon as possible. But
not all knowledge becomes obsolescent at once!
There are more serious threats to the future of liberal arts education, as I have conceived it, allied to this ill-conceived notion that
the university be crisis-oriented. They are more serious in that they
challenge the supremacy of the authority of reason, or better, the
authority of intelligence, which gradually has emerged as the ideal of
the secula r university however much it has been breached by different
pressure groups who in behalf of some private faiths or vested interests
h ave struggled against its recognition. This ideal is intimately related
to the conception of the university in the words of Karl Jaspers, "as
the place where truth is sought unconditionally in all its forms." It
is an ideal which like the value of intelligence in reflective moral
experience is the only valid absolute because it is self-critical, aware
of its own limitations. The view that American institutions of higher
learning stress intelligence and the rational process too much is another
biza rre notion of the educational underworld for which no rational
evidence is advanced. A much more formidable case can be made
for the opposite view.
Today the challenge to intelligence takes the form of the renewed
cult of raw experience, of glorification of action, passion and sensual
absorption as if they were immediate avenues not only to excitement
but to truth and wisdom. Hoary errors in the history of thought have
been revived to undergird this view when those immersed in its cult
deign to defend it. "We learn by experience," it is said. "We learn
by doing. We learn by going into the fields, streets and factories-by
m arching, demonstrating, fighting, etc." One might just as well say
we lea rn by living, and that the longer we live the more educated
we a re.
This is absurd on its face. But even if it were not, it is apparent
tha t one does not need a university to acquire this kind of educationif one calls it an education. Life is not a school except as a dubious
metaphor. There a re m any ways by which reality may be experienced
or encountered , all legitimate in their context, but the knowing which
gives us understanding and truth is a distinctive mode of experience.
It is not true tha t we learn by experience. We learn through experience, and only when we have the capacity to learn. And what we
lea rn through experience is more likely to be valid when we
confront experience with a prepa red mind. It is the cultivation
and development of the prepa red mind and its a ttendant functions
of trained observa tion and disciplined imagination which is or should
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be the objective of all schooling, and especially schooling on the college
and university level.
It is true that ultimately we learn by doing. But it is not true that
all doing is a form of learning. Here, too, the role of ideas or hypotheses
is central. Their presence is what distinguishes the intelligently learned
man from the learned ass, from the dogmatic autodidact, and from
those long on experience but short in wisdom.
Lest you think I exaggerate the extents to which the cult and
glorification of raw experience is cried up today by those who pander
to popular life-styles among students, I quote from a college reader,
Starting Over, hot off the press by two professors at the University
of California at Berkeley. "We don't rule out the possibility," they
tell us in their preface, "that Lenny Bruce may have more to teach
us than Alfred North Whitehead . . ." With characteristic lack of
precision, they fail to tell us about what, aside from obscenity, Lenny
Bruce can teach us more than Alfred North Whitehead--one of the
profoundest minds of the Twentieth Century. To learn about obscenity
one hardly needs to attend a university!
Effective schooling of the prepared mind requires clinical experience that may take the student out of the classroom to amplify the
meaning and test the validity of what he has learned within it. But
it must be intelligently planned, supervised, and carefully assessed.
Emphasis on clinical experience, where appropriate, cannot be overstressed. It is analogous to the experimental approach. It is a far cry,
however, from current demands that uncontrolled, divers, helter-skelter
forays into "life" and "experience" be recognized as integral and
valid elements of university education. The demand that "action
Ph.D.'s" be awarded, that graduate students receive credit for leading
rent strikes, organizing the unemployed, fighting pollution, and that
undergraduates be granted academic recognition merely for the experience of traveling or living abroad is a reductio ad absurdum of
this view. One may as well give them academic awards for sex and
marriage!
Another challenge to liberal arts education is implicit in the demand
that the research, teaching, scholarship-in short its total curricular
activity in whole and part, be "relevant." What nonsense is covered
by that term! The cry for relevance extends from the simple demand
that the teacher talk sense to the demand that what he teaches, regardless of his subject matter, help achieve the classless society. Strictly
speaking, the term "relevant" is relational. We must always ask:
"Relevant to what?" Normally in the life of mind what is taught,
if the teaching is good, is relevant to a problem. Problems themselves
are relevant to domains of experience. The problem of who first propounded the theory of organic evolution or the labor theory of value
is irrelevant to the problem of its validity. One man's problem may
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be irreleva nt to another m an's purposes or interests without affecting
its significance in its own field. In a well ordered university, where
the scholarly fac ulty decides the existence of certain fields of study
in a university is prim a f acie evidence that the field is deemed to have
educa tional significance in the light of the objectives of liberal arts
study, a ny attempt to control the relevance of studies except on
educational grounds is an intolerable interference with academic
freedom.
Most claims tha t higher education be "relevant" are either politically motivated or inspired by na rrow utilitarian considerations. I
shall discuss the political motivations below. The others are open to
the easy retort tha t narrow utilitarian considerations a re irrelevant
not only to the ideals a nd delights of liberal arts education but to the
multiple, indirect and enla rged social usefulness of what is not immediately usefol. Einstein's special theory of rela tivity h ad no earthly
use when it was first propounded. But it was highly relevant to a
genuine problem- the negative findings of the Michaelson-Morley
experiment. The current demands for relevance would have driven
Einstein and many others out of the university. Whitehead used to
celebrate the perpetual uselessness of the theory of numbers and
symbolic logic. Although they have now found a use, they have always
had a sufficient justification to those who enjoy the games and beauty
of abstraction.
Rela ted to these challenges is the critical challenge to liberal arts
education which stresses the importance of immediacy-the demands
tha t the curriculum offer solutions to complex problems that can only
lead to early if not overnight tra nsforma tions of our society, economy,
law and culture. R adical activist students are properly aware of the
distance between the goals of the American dream and our current
achievement-something which they have learned in large part through
the despised curricular offerings of the present. They are not properly
aware- indeed, they aggressively ignore- the fact tha t American society
has again and again raised its sights and periodically redefined the
goals of the American d ream. They have, therefore, systematically
ignored the dista nce covered in removing the obstacles to political
and social equality, and despite the great problems and injustices still
remaining, the magnitude of the social gains. Disregarding the fact
that American colleges and universities have been the great centers
of outspoken criticism and dissent in American life, they have pictured
them as an exploitive institution of the Establishment caricaturing the
whole notion of the Establishment-a vulgarized M arxist view of
" the ruling class"-with their charge that the organized working
class is part of it. I n consequence, they have d emanded not only that
their instruction be relevant in relation to their purposes but that
it be oriented to reformist even revolutiona ry objectives vaguely de-
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fined but completely and explicitly critical of every aspect of American
history and culture.
The truth tends to be the first casualty of every war and crusade.
One-sided criticism can distort the truth every whit as much as
apologetic accolades. On several campuses the classes of professors
who have not taken a sufficiently critical stance to one or another
aspect of American culture-in the eyes of enraged students-have
been disrupted. There is no record of interference (which would have
been just as deplorable!) with the instruction of teachers openly
sympathetic to the Viet Cong or to the totalitarian despotisms of
Castro, Mao-tse-tung or the Kremlin with their holocaust of victims.
It is not surprising, therefore, that these radical activists and their
faculty allies have denounced the ideal of "objectivity" as a bourgeois
myth. To challenge the ideal of objectivity, difficult as it may be to
reach, as a chimera is to renounce the ideal of the truth which is the
raison d'etre of the liberal university. To deny that the concept of
objectivity is intelligible is incoherent and self-contradictory, for it
would prevent us from distinguishing between historical fiction and
historical fact, and make groundless and arbitrary even the radical
activist's litany of alleged American crimes.
An unexpectedly formidable challenge to liberal arts education
has been nurtured by some liberals so acutely aware of the failures
of the liberal tradition to achieve its promise, that they have betrayed
its perennially valid ideals-sometimes out of simple confusion and
sometimes out of cowardice-moral and physical. I refer to the
failure to recognize the human experience or the human condition
as the basic source and orientation of the curriculum, and the resulting and growing fragmentation of the curriculum into isolated blocks
of study, into "Black Studies," "Afro-American Studies," "Third
World Studies." The Black experience, the African experience, the
Third World experience, the Jewish experience, the Irish experience,
etc., are all part of the human experience and as such worthy of
inclusion in those areas and subject matter whose understanding is
required to achieve a proper liberal education. The revision of the
traditional liberal arts courses in history, literature, art and the social
sciences to do justice to the various ethnic expansions of human
experience has long been overdue and is currently being undertaken.
That is one thing. The organization of special blocks of study often
open in effect only to members of minority groups, controlled and
organized by these students and their representatives, breaches important assumptions of liberal education as well as the principles of
academic freedom. Here I stress only the educational aspect of the
question. There are no class truths, national truths or racial truths
as distinct from truths, objective truths about classes, nations and
ethnic groupings. The Black experience is neither necessary nor suf-
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ficient to understand the truth about slavery any more than the experience of white Southerners is necessary or sufficient to understand
the truth about the R econstruction Period, or experience in Fascist
or Communist countries is necessary or sufficient to learn or teach
the truths about their terroristic regimes. I find it highly significant
that the powerful criticisms of the proposals for separate courses of
study for black students, m ade by distinguished Negro educators like
K enneth Clark, Sir Arthur Lewis, Bayard Rustin and others, have
provoked no considered replies but only derisive epithets. Many administrators who have supported the demand for autonomous Black
Studies programs h ave done so not on supportable educational grounds
but out of fea r that their campuses would be torn apart. Professor
H enry Rosovsky who did pioneering work as Chairman of the Harvard
Committee on African and Afro-American studies in devising an
undergraduate major in Afro-American studies with the same standards of academic excellence that obtained for other majors flatly
charges tha t the action of the Harvard faculty reversing the report
of his committee and in effect giving black undergraduate students
"powers hitherto held only by Harvard senior faculty and denied to
junior faculty, graduate students and non-black undergraduates" was
adopted in the face of threats and violence.
To make exceptions to p rinciples of equity as well as valid educational policy in order to compensate for historical injustices is an
inverse form of racism just as objectionable to sensitive and intelligent
members of minority groups as traditional forms of racism. To lower
standards of judgement and excellence, to dilute content and subject
matter as a form of intellectual reparations is to restore and compound
the infamies of the doubl e standard. The student is just as much a
second class academic citizen if an institution discriminates in his
favor on the basis of his skin color as he is when it discriminates
against him on the same basis.
There a re dangerous tendencies in the admission policies of some
institutions which mistakenly b elieve that democracy in education
requires that all groups in the population be represented proportionally
among the student body and faculty. A case m ay be made for the
view that in American democratic society everyone has a human right
to the kind and degree of schooling from which he can profit and
which will facilitate the growth of his intellectual and cultural powers
to their fullest. But a right to an education no more carries with it
the right to a specific kind of education or to the same degree of
education for everyone than the right to medical treatment entails
the right to the same kind of medical treatment no m atter what
one is ailing from. H ere as elsewhere individual need, interest, capacity should be the determining considerations. Democracy is not a
belief in the moral equ ality of those who a re the same or alike but
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in the moral equality of difference-whether they a re physically
different, racially different or intellectually different.
The liberal a rts conception of higher educa tion is based u pon a
belief in the community of educational interest among teacher-schola rs
and learners and administrators. This conception is being threatened
by something analogous to a "class struggle" view according to which
the university is a factory in which students a re processed a nd
exploited by their teachers and administrators. But knowledge is not a
commodity of which one can say tha t the more one has of it the
less remains for others. It belongs to the family of values of which it
is true to say tha t they a re not diminished but enhanced by being
shared. Education is not in the first instance a quest for power,
whether student power or faculty power but a quest for truth, a
means for growth, spiritual enlargement and m aturation . Where a
community of educational interest prevails in the university this does
not preclude difference, sometimes sha rp differences about a multitude
of things. But so long as the class struggle conception of education
does not enter to disrupt rational exch ange of views, all of these
differences a re negotiable in the same way by which we seek to resolve
scientific differences. This is why the university can be both a conservator of ¥alues and attitudes as well as an innovator . It cannot
legisla te for the community, certainly not for the democratic community. It serves that community without being either a servant or
master of it.
All the challenges to liberal education I have considered come
to a head in frank espousals for the politicalization of the university.
By the politicalization of the university is meant that direct involvem ent of the university as a corp orate institution in the controversial
political a nd social problems of the d ay. The radical activists of our
time speak out of both sides of their mouths on this question , sometimes condemning the university for allegedly alread y being politically
involved, and as guilty of betraying the ideal of non-involvement,
and sometimes- the real burden of their song-condemning the university for being involved on the wrong political side. Not content
with h aving won the right for individual faculty members to espouse
any political cause they wish without p rejudicing their position in the
university community, they seek to draw the university as such officially
into the endorsement, teaching and organiza tion of programs for
social reform and / or revolution of the society on whose largesse a nd
support the university ultima tely depends. Since these activists assert
tha t no program of social reform or commitment can dispense with
an ideology, they are proposing that universities cease m aking a fetish
of objectivity and neutrality and become ideological institutions.
This is a recommendation which if acted upon can result only
in educational disaster. If the universities a ttempt to politicize them-
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selves, a nd instead of studying, proposing and critically analyzing
p rograms of social action, seek to implement these programs as part
of a n agenda of social action, the unconverted larger community will
not only withdraw its support but purge or suppress them. The universities will lose their ha rd won relative autonomy and be politicalized
with a vengeance but from an ideological quarter hardly congenial to the radical activists who will be swept away together
with their liberal allies. Although I am convinced that the consequences
of politica lizing the university will be suicidal, I do not wish to base
m y criticisms of the proposal on these grounds but in terms of the
values of the liberal arts traditions.
The a ttempt to line up the university as such behind some particula r program of reform or revolution testifies to a failure to establish a consensus or win agreement to positions on the basis of a rgument
and evidence. There is very little tha t a university can do as such that
a faculty of persuaded individuals cannot do as well. Where a university
takes a stand on capitalism or socialism, or war and peace or methods
of urban reconstruction, in the n ature of the case the position of the
minorities whi ch cannot accept that stand becomes precarious. They
a ppear as m alcontents a nd troublemakers sabotaging the larger commitments of the university.
Once the university becomes politicalized, the students, too,
become politically pola rized if they have not already reached that
sta te . Students a nd faculty then join forces in ways already familiar
to us not only in the universities of some foreign countries but on
some of our own campuses. Factionaliza tion among extremists leads
to a kind of competition among them to implement the corporate
policies more vigorously and to push the university into the forefront
of the struggle to radicalize society. The effect of ideological commitm ent on depa rtments- on the appointment and promotion of faculty
personnel can easily be imagined . The normal frictions and conflicts
tha t op era te even when the universtiy is uncommitted and permits all
the winds of doctrine to blow freely on the campus become exacerbated
to a point where p rofessional competence, which should be the first
and main criterion in ma tters of this kind, is subordinated, under all
sorts of pretexts a nd ra tionalizations, to ideological considerations. The
canons of professional ethics and integrity a re celebra ted in the holid ay rhetori c on convocations and commencements but are abandoned
in practice.
That politicalization of the univeristy constitutes an obvious threa t
to academic freedom is acknowledged . Sometimes in an effort to
minimize the danger, advocates of politicalization narrow the scope
of the " political" to grave issues or to periods of crisis. But the definition of grave issues depends on how intensely human beings feel
about them, and the world is always in crisis. More often, and

67

especially among students and junior faculty, academic freedom is
regarded as a kind of class privilege of professors that can readily be
sacrificed or compromised to further larger ideological goals or
purposes.
It may sound harsh but there is convincing evidence tha t it is
true: Academic freedom in the United States today is threatened
not so much by fundamentalist churchmen, reactionary businessmen,
and political demagogues, as much as it is by ideological fanatics
among students and faculty. It is ironical that they owe their presence
in the unive rsity and the fact that they are given an opportunity to
proclaim their ideological wares to the very principles of academic
freedom which they violate and undermine by their disruptive activities. They ignore the truth tha t genuine tolerance does not require
tolerance of the actively intolerant.
No one can reasonably defend the status quo in American high er
educa tion. For one thing there is no such thing as the status quo. For
another, the growth of American universities in the p ast has not
always been guided by a critical and self-conscious philosophy of education. M any activities and enterprises could more appropriately be
housed elsewhere. The university cannot be all things to all men,
an instrument of every purpose, without losing its intellectual dignity
and authority and ultimately its honesty. Everything depends upon
the methods of change and the direction of change. I take it for
granted for the moment that the methods will be through the rational
and autonomous decisions of its faculties uncoerced by political groups
from within or without. If I am mistaken about this a nd the fate of
the university is a function of which politcal groups triumph in
American life, academic freedom both of Lehrfreiheit and L ernfreiheit will be eclipsed.
The direction of change which holds the greatest promise for
deepening, enriching and developing the great humanistic and scientific legacies of university education is by liberalizing the curriculum
and processes of teaching and learning in the light of the ideals of
the liberal arts tradition. These legacies m ay stem from the contributions of socially privileged and elite groups of the past. T oday
our technology makes it possible for all men a nd women who a re
willing and able, to pa rtake of them, to contribute to them, a nd
to find meaning and enjoyment in them. The liberal arts tradition is
strengthened by the principles of academic freedom and in turn
draws support from them. For both keep open the p a thways to new
truths and new visions of excellence in m an's unending quest better
to understand himself, society and the environing world.
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Only 1n Our Learning-The
Purpose of An Academic Community
By

HARRIS

L.

WOFFORD, JR.

In this era of the withering of consent, when-as the statement
convening this conference says-"conflict and change have challenged
the very foundation of our institutions," let me start on an unusual
note--of agreement. "The major threat," I agree, "has been to the
basic idea of . . . a community of scholars committed to the search
for truth through exploration, experimentation and dialogue." The
search for truth is indeed the highest purpose of an academic community; it is truth as a question that can make man free. This is
the vision without which people perish. Without it, we in our multiversities may win the world but lose our souls. Yet it is this basic
idea of a community of scholars that is in clear and present danger.
Those are old words which for most people have run dry. But
I suggest tha t we are entering a period when more and more people
will be ready for them, a nd even ready for that plain Puritan thing
necessary to give them meaning-hard work. At least that is one
possibility, which in putting the question of purpose first in this conference, you are helping to realize.
You are not alone, for students before you have been given the
same priority to this same fundamental question. What is the central
purpose of an academic community, and what has caused the present
confusion of purpose? Despite their disconcerting and disappointing
actions and reactions, they have awakened academia from its pragmatic slumbers. Their answers may be appalling, but their main
questions are right. Seeing quantity expand, they ask questions of
quality; seeing means increase, they ask questions of ends; seeing the
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technological society take over more and more of life, they ask
questions of freedom and purpose.
If we do believe in dialogue, this is the time to take account of
the events of this last decade of student awakening, constructive
action, discontent and disruption, and see whether they or we have
learned a nything. "The Fire Next Time" at least on campus m ay be
more bravado than prophecy, but there has been something of a fire
in academia these last years. We know some of the casualties, but do
we recognize any benefits of the fire last time ? Do we understand
what caused the threat in the first place ?
If the fire had simply been put out a nd business as usual resumed,
then everything from the Peace Corps thro;.igh Berkeley to the beserk
violence of last year could blur in our memory as a rise and fall that
reflected the larger tragedies of the sixties. But though the inadequacy
of the student pla tform for academic reform or revolution is now
self-evident, the discontent with the old system is more widespread
than ever; and though the wild disruptions a re diminishing, students
continue to question everything. Perhaps this state of permanent discontent is in fact the chief thing we have gained.
With the crisis of universal higher education at h and, with the
number of students in colleges and universities doubling in one d ecade,
with the expansion of knowledge outdistancing academia's ability
to assimilate and teach it, with the increasing complexity of society
requiring a much higher intellectual level among a much larger proportion of the people, with the big buzzing confusion of the world
reaching almost everyone through the mass media a nd almost no one
seeing the world steady and whole, if there were no discontent it
would be an educator's duty to create some. But none need be
invented now, for student disillusion is spreading a nd once-revolutionary hopes are tasting ashen in their mouths. With this m ay come
new wisdom, which it should be an educator's duty to discern and
promote.
Easy R ider's epitaph for the hip and psychedelic scene, " We
blew it," appears to be accura te also for the student uprisings on
campus-and, it should be added, for most of our efforts a t academic
reform in response to those up-risings, as well as for all the green
and golden hopes of the early Sixties. R eading the Yale Daily News
for distance (and to keep up with a freshman daughter ), I was
struck by the articles celebrating the change of editorial staffs and
the beginning of the new decade. " We were the brightest kids they
ever saw," reminisced an outgoing editor who summa rized the academic revolution his class-1966-70-had sought and wrought:
"We got rid of the coat and tie rule as soon as we arrived
at Yale. It went out one door as we came in the other.
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Parietals followed a year later. We have always been
proponents of change, but how much have we done?"
The new politics they were ushering in was to be "exciting and classy
and under control." It was not to be "assassinations, or Song My,
or students cursing administrators or total confusion." "So now," this
Yale senior concluded , "we listen to records and read history and
go to church and try to learn right from wrong all over again. Next
time we get a crack a t changing things, maybe we won't blow it." 1
The report that students were turning to history or to church was
as surprising as the long lead editorial by the new staff entitled
"For a Rational University." For "the New Year, the New Decade,
and the New News," the editors resolved, "in the spirit of the season,"
that "faith in reason must be our basic premise." To indicate that
they took thi£ old-fashioned linear proposition seriously, they added:
"If the world around us chooses to adopt another
standard, we must try to hold our ground. We believe
that reason, no matter how faulty it can sometimes be,
is the only vehicle for creating a valid community at this
university and in this society."
They noted that the student tactics of 1969 had dangerously polarized
the university:
"Some faculty members now appear markedly less receptive to continuing to break down the master-pupil
barriers of the past in order to restructure Yale into a
practicing community of scholars. For their part, many
students seem acutely insensitive to a legitimate faculty
concern over academic freedom, a concern which in
many cases stems from personal exposure to the university
disruptions presaging Hitler's Germany, to the McCarthy
attacks on the academic community during the 1950's,
and to the contemporary student and police violence at
Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard and elsewhere."
The new Yale directors then call for an end to unreasonable attacks
on the University. "Destroying this best of society's institutions will
never save us from its worst," they write. After proposing several
reforms, they warn: "Yet our expectations from the university cannot
be unlimited ."
"As students, we are here to exchange ideas, to learn, to
acquaint ourselves with academic method, not to create
1 Timothy Bates, "War in the Back of the Mind," Yale Daily News,
January 21, 1970.
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or administer an ideal social organism. While we should
rightly pa rticipate in decision-making in our community,
neither by background, nor expertise, nor interest a re we
equipped to oversee its day-to-day governance. While we
should use Yale's resources to construct models for social
reform and must attack racism, repression, and reaction
when they appear here, we cannot assume tha t the
university is responsible for or representa tive of all the
ills of the rest of the society ...
"We must, finally, accept the fact tha t only in our learning can we expect to approach truth because only in our
lea rning can we come closest to operating free of the
society around us. And to defend and protect our academic freedom we must learn to accept some of the
inhumane aspects of our life here because our intellectual
pursuits hold out the best promise of a better future. Yale
offers us an opportunity to reflect, to examine ourselves,
to ask ourselves wha t we can do to overcome the
wrongs we see a round us. That is our obligation and
privilege here-to pursue truth where we are now most
free so that tomorrow we can work to liberate ourselves
and our society where we are not."2
Tha t is quite a case for liberal education. It h as been a long time
since student leaders have been hea rd calling intellectual pursuits
"our obligation and privilege" and saying tha t "only in our learning"
can we hope to free ourselves or our society. At least in the college
I know best, our student planners kept crossing out the phrase "liberal
education" every time one of the over-40 staff put it in our draft
catalog. A student from Antioch finally wrote, " What in the world
is it?" And a Long Island girl said, " It is not a liberal education I
want. I hate liberals. I want an education to be a radical." Tha t was
in 1967, 1968 a nd 1969, when students were intoxicated with shortcuts to enlightenment or liberation, when they were con fidently substituting "a community of friends committed to the enjoyment of
immedia te happiness through drugs, sex and sensitivity groups"-or
"a community of revolutionaries committed to fighting the system by
attacking pigs and by other forms of blowing people's minds"-in
place of "a community of scholars committed to the search for
truth through exploration, experimenta tion and dialogue."
That is not quite fair. They, too, saw themselves in search for
truth, a nd this does not do justice to the varieties of approach along
the spectrum from hippie to activist. But most of the student reformers

2

Yale Daily News, January 26, 1970.

72

and revolutionaries would share the sentiments of one of Old Westbury's
most articluate student planners who wrote of his generation:
"The thought that there is some abstract body of knowledge, some residue of learning, some classical ideas
essential to an educated m an is in basic conflict with their
increasing sense of the subjective, the profoundly personal
nature of all perceived reality. The over-intellectuality
and verbality of a fierce quest of ideas in vacuo rubs
against their grain. Pre-college training today is so
rigorous, television so broadening and drugs so mindexpanding that contemporary college students are scornful of mind-body separation. They've sampled sex, trained
their sensitivity, grooved with light shows and are not
about to be told that growth occurs best by slithering
an idea around a table."3
The man who wrote that would not, I suspect, write so confidently
today, though he still suspects the amoral intellect that slithers an idea
around a table. Rigorous pre-college training of the current student
generation h as not been very manifest at Old Westbury, although the
first 230 students were chosen from out of nea rly 2000 applicants.
Nor is there any evidence that television, drugs, sex, sensitivity, or
light shows all added together provide a good foundation for higher
education. Nor has that student planner's prediction come true. Old
Westbury would succeed despite itself, he wrote, for its leaders' "instincts are better than their words . . . . Call it softness or call it
decency: Old Westbury will end up allowing their students to do
their thing."
When it became apparent to many of us that the students' thing
was anything but a liberal education, as interdisciplinary programs
tended to lack discipline, independent study amounted to very little
study, and those who engaged in off-campus action came back not
thirsty for theories to understand their experience but thirsty for more
action, most of the over-40 faculty and staff drew the line and held
their ground. Rejecting student demands for 50 percent of the seats on
all decision-making bodies, or the more radical demand for " Power
to the People" on a one-man-one-vote basis, and maintaining the
faculty's primary responsibility over teaching and curriculum, we
suffered a small sit-in, and are still experiencing a smoldering civil
war around the issue of Student Power.
Underneath the question of governance is the central student
demand for the liberty of everyone (except the president) to do his
thing ( and get a Bachelor of Arts degree for it) . All this political
3 Ralph Keyes, "The College That Students H elped Plan," Change Magazine, March - April, 1969, p. 16.
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struggle within the College collided constantly with serious efforts at
curriculum planning, educational search, or scholarship. It was not
just that the trouble with participatory democracy is, as H. G. Wells
said of socialism, that it takes too many evenings; the trouble is also
tha t those interested in scholarship, educational search and curriculum
planning do not want to spend their evenings in politics.
Yet our non-success in building a college with students as full
partners and with a curriculum addressed in pa rt to pressing contemporary problems such as race and poverty, marks an ironic kind
of success for an experimental college. The purpose of an experimental
college of liberal arts is to learn by trial and error how to provide
better liberal education. An experiment by definition is an effort that
may not work. It is in facing, analyzing, and learning from a failure,
as much as from a success, that an experimental college justifies itself.
Wrestling with an intense form of the spirit of our time, we
have learned a lot at Old Westbury, and it is encouraging to see that
some of the same lessons were also being learned by the 1970 editors
at Yale. On the matter of student power, for example, the Yale
Daily News says just what I would say from our experience with full
student partnership: while students should rightly participate in
decision-making in the academic community, neither by background,
nor expertise, nor interest are they equipped to oversee its day-to-day
governance. The forms of participation will require careful constitution-making that takes into account the primary teaching authority of
the faculty and recognizes that students are there primarily, as the Yale
editorial puts it, to acquaint themselves with academic method, to exchange ideas, to learn.
But what have we learned about the underlying educational issue?
If, as the Yale editorial suggests, the opportunity for students to
reflect, to examine themselves, to ask what they can do to overcome
the wrongs they see around them, in short to pursue truth and to learn
h as all along been offered at Yale--or at Harvard or Columbia or
San Francisco or Berkeley- then what h as all the shouting and shoving
been about? Are we just coming full circle?
The opportunity for a liberal education has been there and is
there, no doubt, in the library if nowhere else, but students h ave
claimed that great obstacles stood in the way of the education they
needed. Fortuna tely their negative insights went beyond such impediments as coats and ties and parietals, and their several more significant
complaints have been widely registered: lectures are too large and too
frequent and should not be the main form of learning; too little good
teaching takes place and too little attention is paid to the quality of
teaching; too much attention is paid to exams, grades and credits with
not enough joy in learning or ad venture in ideas; students are too
often treated as subjects not citizens, with neither their consent sought
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nor dissent heard ; the body of knowledge is cut up in too many
compartments and the lines between them are too rigid; the structure
of special departments leaves too little room in the curriculum for
the study of critical general problems such as racial injustice, urban
chaos and war, or perennial personal problems of sex, politics a nd
religion.
Yet even when all these complaints h ave been m et, and we tried to
meet them all at Old Westbury, there is still something missing. The
scaffolding of liberal education may be there, but the substance and
the soul of it a re most elusive. The liberal arts appropriate to an age,
the arts by which the people can lea rn to be free in a particular time
a nd place, h ave always been elusive, but never more so than now.
In the early days of the academy through the Middle Ages and
into the 19th century it was assumed that there was a common thing
called liberal education that enabled a person to become his own
teacher, to do his own thing, and to serve the la rger common thingthe republic- to which he belonged. L anguage and mathematics,
the trivium and quadrivium, were considered to be as essential for the
mind of m an as bread and water and wine a re for the body; and the
major works of litera ture were the ma terials on which students tried
to master these liberal a rts. T eachers ad vanced their own ideas and
pursued their own research, but they also helped students meet other
probably greater teachers, like Pla to a nd Aristotle and the authors
of the Bible. The list of great books has grown , like a continuing conversation, and they argue with each other right up to Marx, Freud
and Einstein, but the \,Vestern world's common list can still fit on
two small shelves, in one Encylopaedia Britannica set, and can be
read in less than a life time. In fact, a t St. John's College students read
most of them in four years.
At Old Westbury we tried to combine a modified form of a great
books curriculum with a work-stud y program of education-in-action
focused on the urban condition. With the present a ttitudes of our
students a nd faculty the combination proved unstable, like oil and
water, and students reverted to their platform of letting everyone do
his thing. This is still the general student drive everywhere, as even
the Yale Daily News edito rial demonstrates. In its appeal "For a
Rational University," the editors' curricula r program called for "the
development of as m any new courses as possible," especially a round
contemporary problems, with grea ter emphasis on the creative arts
a nd freedom from depa rtmental structure for "individual courses of
study to fit individual needs a nd desires." This conventional student
wisdom is where we came in a t Old Westbury. If there is a common
thing called liberal education that everyone should be offered, then
"as m any courses as possible" is ha rdly the prescription for a rational
university. If we settle for such an unlimited version of the elective
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system, their grades, requirements and academic disciplines may all
be abolished or loosened, and with them some unnecessary rigidities
and divisions; but through the holes most of what now goes by the
name of liberal education will run out.
Merely holding the dike is no answer. For most of what goes by
the name of liberal education is not good enough. Neither introductory
survey courses nor a potpourri of general education requirements contribute much to anyone's liberal education. The one option very few
colleges or universities offer a student is a coherent curriculum of
liberal arts. It is easy to ridicule the students, for though they can
smell sophistry, hypocrisy and irrelevance, especially in others, it is
clear that with their resistance or hostility to required courses, teachers,
books, history, rules, laws, and hard work, and with their fear of failure
and tendency to play always to their strengths, they are not likely to
get much of a liberal education on their own. But can't we see tha t
consciously or unconsciously the students are ridiculing us. The principle of letting everyone do his thing is already the prevailing practice
in most academic communities: let every depa rtment, every professor,
do his thing. In asking to apply this to themselves, students are compounding the educational anarchy that already divides the universityand they are holding an awful mirror to us. Can't we see the caricature of our incoherent curriculums?
Thirsty people grasp for dirty water when there is no clean
water around, and if they have never tasted clean water they do not
know the difference. Students press for academia's dirtiest water, the
ultimate irrelevance of an undisciplined and unintellectual curriculum,
because that is all most of them have known .
If this analysis is correct, then the highest priority of colleges and
universities should be the search for coherent curriculums of liberal
education appropriate for the late 20th century-and the maintenance
of any pockets of such education that do exist.
If this recent round of student protest and academic reform h as
not taken us very far, the recognition of that failure m ay be the beginning of the wisdom we need. It takes no great skill for us to
puncture the pretensions of the students' platform, any more than
it took great skill on the students' part to expose the most glaring
faults of conventional academia. But this negative round will be
worthwhile if we have discovered our ignorance, if we take what we
do not know as a statement of what we need to know, if we join
together for the next stage of the search, knowing tha t never has the
search for liberal education been more important or more urgent or
more difficult. If there is this thing, liberal education, then the search
for it, however elusive, should be the primary purpose of an academic
community. And the main thing an institution of higher education
should say to a student, through its curriculum and the words of its
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faculty and administration, is its best collective judgment on what the
student most needs to know and is least likely to know- the ingredients of an education tha t will enable him to "search for truth through
exploration, experimentation and dialogue."
If all this is true, then the chief duty of academic administrators
is just wha t Rosem ary Pa rk prescribed when she left the presidency of
Ba rna rd College. Our job is to be as Socratic as we can-to go
around the academic community asking the central upsetting questions
of purpose. In doing this seriously and gaily, a nd following the questions where they lead , even into controversy in the la rger community,
we may be able to give an example of something other than the amoral
intellect tha t students rightly abhor. At least we will be doing our
part to end the " total confusion" that students feel a round them.
If by such questioning colleges and universities renew the search
a nd scholarship comes alive with exploration, experimenta tion and dialogue, then our academic communities can be, what they ought to
be, a n example for the whole of society. For it is questions of purpose
tha t must be asked in all our a rts and sciences, in our p ersonal lives,
our politics, our technology, and our environment-asked of our na tion
and of the world, and asked with unusual persistence and wisdom.
L et me end with a story of how the students' prophet of revolution, Professor H erbert M a rcuse, came to Old Westbury and took
our students by surprise.
" Wha t do we protest in a college where there is no ROTC and
no military research, where we engage in off-campus action as pa rt of
the curriculum and we a re on all the committees?" a student asked.
"Be h appy." M a rcuse suggested. When told this was a weak answer
in a world where people were being killed every day, he suggested:
"Then get educated." But how could they get properly educa ted in a
university of the Establishment, by the Establishment and for the
Establishment ? "You can," he said, noting tha t h e had got the
found a tion for everything he has thought a nd done in the Imperial
Gymnasium of the K aiser's Berlin. They could do it if they read the
m ajor books and took the hard subj ects. Just to cope with the m odern
world, he said, people needed to be more educated, more intellectual
than most people h ave ever been, and to be agents of change, or
revolution, they would have to be ten times as educated and intellectual. When our students still resisted him, especially on the importance of reading books, he said, " I sense in you the same deep-rooted
intellectual inferiority complex, the same intellectual m asochism and
fea r of things of the mind tha t I find in young Americans generally.
But d eep-rooted though it be, it must be uprooted, by love if possible
and by force if necessary."
Tha t is one definition of a curriculum. In one way or another
this is the point which must now be made. If we mean it, we will
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take not only our students but ourselves by surprise, and that should
always be one of the purposes of an academic community.
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Needed for the 1970's:
An Educational Policy for
the Social Sciences*
By

CLAUDE

s.

PHILLIPS, JR.

A remarkable irony is becoming apparent in American education:
it may not have the ability to reform itself in the realm of intercultural education. The irony stems from the fact that the need for reform is apparently agreed on by many people concerned with the
question, while on the contrary there appears to be no organized, and
little open, opposition to the need. Yet intercultural concepts are still
struggling for acceptance at every level of American education. How
can this situation be explained?
There is no gainsaying the effort to influence intercultural education. Indeed, the massiveness of the effort in the last twenty years
almost defies comprehension. Conferences, studies and reports fill
countless volumes. O rganizations of all kinds have been created to
further intercultural understanding, such as Education and World
Affairs, the Institute of International Education, the International
Studies Association, E xperiment in International Living, Community
Ambassadors, Crossroads-Africa, friendship associations, and world
t0urs. Universities and colleges have set up international studies programs and overseas projects involving both faculty and students. They
have special research programs on their campuses and many have
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joined together in consortia for international cooperation. The U .S.
government has entered the field with far-reaching programs such
as the Fulbright-Hays Act, the National Defense Education Act, the
High1cr Education Act, the International Education Act and the
Peace Corps. Foundations h ave poured millions of dollars into intercultural activites. Private citizens' groups have been formed for foreign policy studies or support of the United Nations. "Neglected"
languages have been introduced even into elementary and secondary
schools at various places. The list of efforts at intercultural education
is almost limitless.
The impact of these efforts h as been so meager as to be startling.
Conferences are still being convened to study the problem of how to
incorporate intercultural studies into the educational system. The
overall effect so far has been so small that 90% of the students in
Liberal Arts colleges as recently as 1964 still graduated without a
single course which dealt with Non-Western cultures.l While some
outsta nding efforts a t intercultural studies have been made in some
schools, colleges and universities, the total impact is almost negligible.
Furthermore, the International Educa tion Act has not been funded,
and probably will not be funded by as much as one dollar. AID programs a re gradually being reduced without any public debate on
alternative policies. The foundations h ave begun a drastic cutback
in their support of international studies.2 L et us face the facts: International studies have had little measurable impact on higher education, less on secondary and elementary education, and practically none
on the general public.
There is a real irony in the failures to date, an irony which stems
from the very processes we used to combat parochialism and ethnocentrism. We set up area studies programs, created new courses with
international or area foci, instituted overseas projects and seminars,
facilitated faculty and student exchanges, welcomed foreign students
and encouraged increased research in foreign areas. We created interdisciplinary programs established new faculty dialogues and enriched
student alternatives. We benefitted from foundation grants and U.S.
1 Non-Western Studies in the L iberal Arts College. (Washington: Association of American Colleges, 1964).
2 Karl W . Deutsch notes with dismay that th e present retrenchment constitutes a "partial intellectual disarmament in international affairs" at the very
time when the United Sta tes is entering a "period of increasing vulnerability
and lessening control of world affairs." Surely, he conclud es:
"It will take more- not less-knowledge, skill an d competence for the next
generation of American leaders to cope with these international prob lems of
the 1970's and 1980's. To reduce the intellectua l source of this knowledge
now, by cutting back on international research, might prove to be a truly fateful
decision- a national decision that should not be taken lightly or as a r esult of
absentmindedness." "The Coming Crisis of Cross-National and International
Research in the United Sta tes," AGLS Newsletter, Vol. XIX, no. 4 (April
1968), pp. 2, 3.
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government support. We established new journals, formed new professional organizations and set up new consortia. Considering the
massiveness of the effort, we must be chagrined that the impact has
been so small.
This is not to suggest that there have been no successes, for there
have been. Entrenched international and area programs now exist in
the curricula of numerous institutions of higher learning and the overseas involvement of colleges, universities and individual faculty members is at an all-time high. But the expectations of, say 1955, have
not been realized. We expected that a world perspective would gradually permeate the academic world: that faculties would see their
disciplines in the context of universal manifestations and that the
educated man-surely still the purpose of higher education-would
reflect an intellectual awareness of the universal human condition.
Were our expectations unrealistic, or did we proceed by the wrong
means?
Since the expectations are clearly justified, I think we must look
at the means we employed. What we did was to make international
studies an addendum to what already existed. We did not demand
that the curriculum, the faculty and the departments be universalized but only that universalistic patches be added. This has resulted
in the grand anomaly: The majority of faculty members in the social
sciences and humanities still teach the majority of courses which deal
overwhelmingly with United States and European cultures, while a
minority of such faculty are permitted to teach a minority of courses
dealing with the other two-thirds of the world's cultures. Perhaps
the patchwork route was the only road open to us in the 1950's and
1960's. But our concern must now shift from the past and present and
concentrate on the challenge of the 1970's and 1980's.
What of the Future?
We have a good idea of some developments over the next seventeen years which must become part of the context in which we plan.
In May 1967, the U .S. Bureau of the Census projected college enrollments to 1985, based on four different scales (with 1967-68 enrollment gauged at approxima tely 6,237,000 ). The most conservative
scale projects a 1985 enrollment at 9,695,000 and the most generous
scale projects it at 11,846,000.3 In 1967, the Commissioner of Labor
Statistics reported that there were 265 ,000 full-time college teachers.
By 1975, he said, we will need 275,000 new college instructors:
100,000 just to handle the increased enrollment, and 175,000 for re3 Population Estimates, Series P-25, No. 365, May 1967, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. , 20402. Cf. Sidney G . Tickton, "The Magnitude of American Higher Education in 1980," in Campus 1980 edited by
Alvin C. Eurich (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), pp. 10-14.
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placements of those who die, retire or resign. While the quality and
supply of college teachers may be improved in the years immediately
ahead, the Commissioner said, "nevertheless, it is likely that the
number of well-qualified persons available for teaching positions will
continue to be insufficient to meet the demand in many subject fields
through the 1970's."4
Also in 1967, admissions officers for graduate schools anticipated
a "flood" of graduate applications in the years ahead, and asserted
that the na tion's graduate schools are simply not prepared to meet
such an increase.5
These figures tell us at least three things about our future: ( 1) enrollments will continue to rise at both the undergradua te and graduate levels; (2) there will be an accelera ting demand for fully-qualified professors; and (3 ) the universities which have been supplying
the professors will probably not be able to meet the demands of the
mid-1970's.
These challenging statistics only tell us part of the future. There
are trends in the universities of which we must be aware. One trend
is the increasing autonomy of departments. Departments now largely
control the higher education process. They determine their own curriculum, select their own colleagues and establish standards for admitting students, all largely independent of any concern for a definition of the university.6 In most social sciences and humanities courses
one-third of the students are future teachers, but few depa rtments
even concern themselves with this fact.7 Few depa rtments coordinate
their activities with others in the same division, much less with other
di,.,isions. Programs for majors and minors are d esigned for the minority who will go to graduate school. The role of the department in
the liberal education of students is almost totally ignored . The trend
of departmentalism, as Charles Frankel has noted, will "produce a
breed of intellectual leaders who cannot speak to one another, or to
other men, across the walls of their specialties," men who will be
"learned experts who a re barbarians."8 One historian h as attributed
4 Quoted in Higher Education and National Affairs, Vol. XVI, No. 16,
April 29, 1967, p. 11. Cf. Tickton, loc. cit., pp. 19-20.
5 See Byron L . Gruesbeck, "Graduate Admissions: Are We Prepared for
the Years Ahead? ," College and University, V ol. 42 , no. 4 (s ummer 1967 ),
p . 506; The Chronicle of High er Edu cation, M ay 3, 1967, p. 6; Allan M .
Carter, "The Decades Ahead: Trends a nd Problems," in Graduate Educat ion
Today, edited by Everett Walters (Washington: American Council on Education, 1965), pp. 223-45; and idem, "Graduate Education and Research in the
Deca des Ahead," in Eurich, op. cit., pp . 257-60.
6 See James H . Billington, " I s Liberal Education D ead? ," Current , July

28, 1968,

pp.

51-57.

See Th e Professional S chool and World Affairs: Report of the Task
Forc e on Education (New York: Education and World Affairs, 1967 ), p . 22.
8 Charles Franke l, in I ssues in University Education, edited by Charles
Frankel (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) , p . 160.
7
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the present student unrest directly to departrnentalism : "the undergradua te, hemmed in everywhere by narrow compa rtments, feels fragmented and frustrated," because scholars "prefer to provide definitive
answers to small questions rather than tenta tive answers to important
ones."9
T wo other trends closely rela ted to departmentalism, are in faculty
m obility and increased research. The former means that professors
p lace their greatest loyalty on their discipline ra ther than their university. The second trend often means increased research on increasingly
narrow subjects a nd concomitantly less teaching by live scholars and
more teaching by T.V. and gradua te assistants.
Another trend is in the di rection of increased financial support to
higher education from the U .S. government. If the past is any guide,
this means channeling even more of the valuable time of needed professors to the filling out of unbelievably long forms, countless interim
repo!'ts, reams of correspondence, and numerous expensive telephone
calls. This tells us nothing about the standards and criteria which
will be established for any increased support. But one trend in this
di rection m ay be gleaned from the suggestion of the President of the
Carnegie Corporation that the United Sta tes Government select certain u niversities for special a ttention as "na tional universities."10
T his is clearly a call for preferred treatment for the wealthy, so-called
elite, universi ties to the neglect of others which a re just as committed
to the purposes of the American university.
There a re trends also in the direction of inter-university cooperation, the Associa ted Universities for International Education providing merely one example. The potential for such coopera tion has hardly been explored, especially in the realm of budgeting, specialized programs, true sha ring of faculty and even in defining the increased
pote,,ti al of aggregations of universities.
There a re other trends which will challenge the programs and
purposes of the universities of the 1970's. We live in an era in which
exponential curves are shooting almost straight up, in popula tion, in
knowledge, in technology, in communications, in urbanization, in
powers of destruction, in conflict, in na tionalism, and in social change.
But the curve in understanding, in tolerance, in accommodation, in
learning to live together, is almost a straight horizontal line from
the time of Buddha to the present. H ere I refer to world-wide trends
which ch allenge the social sciences and humanities in ways which they
h ave hardly begun to consider. Our nationalistic and pa rochially
Western European focus has even led us to neglect our own ch anging
Billington, loc. cit., p. 52.
See th e fu ll address by Ala n Pife r, "Towa rd a Coherent Set of N a tional
Policies for H igh er Educat ion," in The Chronicle of H igher Educat io n, January
29, 1968, pp. 4-5 .
9
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culture and practically to ignore the significance of change on the
world scale. And I have not even touched on other world-wide
trends for the 1970's, such as overcrowding, unprecedented starvation,
civil wars, revolutions, air and water pollution, transportation congestion, wasted resources, increased exploitation of resources, political
and economic frustration, and undreamed-of conditions resulting from
a world in which every culture seeks to accommodate itself to every
other one. The universities, I submit, have hardly begun to face these
realities in the definition of an educated man.
Final!y, it seems quite likely that some time during the 1970's the
United States Government will establish a National Social Science
Foundation . Stimulation for such a foundation has resulted largely
from the fact that F ederal Government support for the social sciences
has declined from 24% of research funds in 1938 to less than 5%
in 1968. Opposition to such a foundation, however, stems from a
general public contempt which believes that "social scientists are not
scientists at all but deal in intuition and vague, unfounded generalizations, or are 'proposition mongers,' a threat to policy makers." 11 The
creation of a N ational Social Science Foundation will, I believe, reduce the contempt simply because possession of money always reduces
contempt. But the challenge remains: what kind of social science research will be supported? Will the social scientists continue to view
the social world from the narrow confines of a discipline, or will they
seek first to establish a science of human living systems in which
disciplines provide specialized knowledge which can be integrated
into the universal perspective?
How Ca n the Challenges be M et?
It would be quite easy for me to suggest grand solutions which
would require nothing less than the destruction of the present system
of higher education and the substitution of some other, presumably
superior system. Thus, as some people h ave done, I could suggest
that future college enrollments be reduced to some earli er figure;
that undergraduate professional schools be abolished ; tha t departments
be recombined into divisions; that professorial specialists not be hired;
that majors be eliminated; that research be punished rather than rewarded; that teaching loads be increased and class sizes decreased ;
and that Federal funds be rejected as an insidious effort to influence
education. I could suggest these things, but I would be irresponsible
in doing so. Why? Because the universities have developed the way
they are in response to very real social and technological pressures
which no other institution has been willing to meet. Specialization has
11 Fred R. Harris, "Political Science and the Proposal for a National Social Science Foundation," The American Political Scie nce R eview, Vol. LXI,
No. 4 (D ecember 1967 ), p . 1088.
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resulted from the remarkable increase in knowledge and this has led
to departmentalization. More, not less, research in the social sciences
is called for because we h ave only begun to understand how human
living systems are created, persist and change. Basic knowledge about
cultural systems must be expanded even as the magnitude of the problems associated with contemporary existence expand. Furthermore,
funding for such resource must come from some source and if not
from governments then from some place else. W e must meet the
challenge, not by destroying the university but by rationalizing it.
The weaknesses in the universities a re nevertheless quite real.
Most high school graduates enter college with no knowledge of the
cultural world in whi ch they live. Knowledge of their own culture
is admittedly weak, so we repeat in college the courses they had in high
school. This constitutes their so-called general education and we then
send them on to their m ajors, which in history, political science, economics and sociology means more United States and some Europea n
culture. Anthropology does deviate from the pattern but neglects the
grea t cultures of Asia a nd the contemporary complex cultures of the
world . Students graduate from college with almost no increased
knowledge of their cultural world . The largest single block of them
become school teachers who repeat the cycle of ignorance. Most of
the remainder go to work or enter professional schools, their formal
cultural education ended. A few go on to gradua te studies but even
in the soci al sciences only a fraction will be involved in intercultural
studies. Armed with Ph.D .'s, and a na rrow specialization, they beco.-rie the new college instructors.
Steven Muller, Vice President for Public Affairs at Cornell University, h as pungently described the results. The undergraduate curriculum, he points out, is increasingly pre-professional, the courses a re
c>s na rrow as the graduate seminars which the instructor had a few
years before, and " the releva nce of undergraduate courses to the
world's a nd society's problems is not usually a major consideration
ir. the determina tion of curri cula."12 H e then exclaims tha t it is no
mystery why students are beginning to revolt, and laments (rightly, I
believe) tha t they a ttack the administra tion when in reality it is the
facv lty whi ch is to blame for the state of affairs .
The college of liberal a rts and sciences is in chaos. More accurately, the social sciences a nd humanities are in chaos and it is no accident that student discontent is aimed directly a t these two divisions.
"Relevancy" has become the key word as students seek some explanation for m an's seemingly unna tural drive to destroy himself. Nevertheless, it would be dishonest for us to pretend that relevancy can be
added by new courses in Afro-American History or the Politics of
12 Steven Muller, "The Administration-Faculty Impasse," Current, August
1968, p. 18.
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Poverty. Such courses m ay be better than nothing but they have the
same weaknesses of all specialized courses: they involve only a few
students and add little to the liberal education role of the university.
The crisis is upon us, but I believe it is fruitless simply to suggest
solutions that will destroy the university or solutions which can only
work in some other university system. On the other hand, some bold
action is called for. Furthermore, we who are in intercultural studies,
I believe, have begun to point the direction and can be leaders in
the necessary reforms. Consequently, I would like to propose three
courses of action which m eet the crisis, which work in the present
system, and which are in the realm of possibility.
1. The social sciences must be universalized.
It is clear that the social sciences must begin to put their house
in order, and that tha t is the challenge of the 1970's a nd 1980's. (I
restrict my remarks here to the social sciences, but the humanities face
a similar challenge.) The main characteristic of the social sciences
since World War II is tha t they have become more and more scientific. This has greatly enhanced our knowledge of social processes and
social behavior. However, the increasing emphasis on technique has
had two unfortunate results: it has led to rigid departmentalism, and
it often fai ls to convey a sense of relevancy at both the graduate and
undergraduate levels. In view of the impact of science on all our
lives, it is difficult for me to imagine that a scientific approach could
be taught in such a way as to be irrelevant and I suspect the irrelevancy stems from the departmentalism rather than science.
My call for uni versalism is based neither on utopianism nor violent
revolution. It is based on trends already present in the social sciences,
trends which will modify but not destroy departmentalism, trends
which have a built-in relevancy. The trends I refer to are those which
intercultural studies have imposed on the social sciences. Although I
noted earlier that our impact h as been small, I must now suggest that
we have succeeded in challenging a nd destroying the theoretical base
of the traditional social sciences. Our constant concern with NonWestern and developing areas forced social scientists to look, but
when they looked their ethnocentrically-based theory began to crumble. Social scientists found that social systems could not simply be
classified as democratic or dicta torial, capitalistic or communistic,
traditional or modern, stable or unstable, literate or pre-li terate, advanced or backwa rd . Social scientists began to be aware of the fact
that Non-Western peoples-with different histories, different technologies, different ideologies, different social systems, different na tural
and social environments-simply could not be understood by the
terminology and tools used in the study of W estern m an .
At the present moment, disciplinary attempts to find a universally
valid theory are largely frustrated by those who still insist on a
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Western-based model which is na tionalistic and parochial. But this is
now a rear-guard action, because a new universalism is on the way
and we must simply throw our support behind it. The beginnings of
the change are seen in the universalistic and seminal works of scholars
from m any disciplines: such as Leslie A. White, Julian Steward, M arshall Sahlins and Elman Service from anthropology; G abriel Almond,
James S. Coleman, and David Easton from political science; Clarence Ayres, K enneth Boulding, and Robert Heilbroner from economics; Daniel Lerner and T alcott Parsons from sociology; L. S.
Stavrianos an d William H . McNeill from history; Donald T. Campbell from social psychology; Alfred Emerson and Anatol Rapoport
from biology; and Norbert Wiener from m athema tics.13 These people ( and others like them) h ave this in common: that they are concerned with total living systems and with scientific explanations of how
they function. From their works come the language of the future:
ecology, eco-system, systems analysis, cultural evolution, input-output
analysis, simulation, game theory, m acro-analysis, cybernetics, and cultural adaptation . Gone is the sterile theory of cultural relativism
and the narrow focus in both space and time. The new perspective
1 3 Following is a selected bibliography of one item from each of the scholars
named:
Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture (N ew York : Grove Press, 1949 );
Juli an H. Steward, Th eory of Culture Change (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1955 ) ;
Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service, eds., Evolution and Culture (An n Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1960 );
Gabri el Alm ond an d J ames S. Coleman, eds. , The Politics of the D eveloping
Areas ( Princeto n: Princeton University Press, 1960);
D avid Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political L ife ( New York: J ohn Wiley &
Sons, 1965) ;
C. E. Ayres, The Th eory of Economic Progress (New York: Schoken Books,
Inc. , 1962 ) ;
Kenneth Boulding, The M eaning of the T we ntieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1964 );
Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great Asce nt (New York: H arper & Row, 196 3);
D aniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Th e Free Press,
1958 );
Talcott P arsons, Societ ies : Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood C liffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966) ;
L. S. Stavrianos, The World Since 1500: A Global H istory (Englewood Cliffs :
Prentice-Ha ll, 1966 );
William H. McNeill, The R ise of the West: A H istory of the Human Community
(C hicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963);
Donald T. Campbell, "Variation a nd Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural
Evolution," in Social Change in D evelo ping Areas, edited b y H erbert R .
Barringer, George I. Blanksten and R aymo nd W. M ack ( Cambridge,
Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965) ;
Alfred E. Emerson, "Human Cultural Evolution and its R elation to Organic
Evolution of Insect Societies," in Barringer, et al.
Anatol R apoport, "Mathematical, Evolutionary a nd Psychological Approaches
to the Study of Total Societies," in The Study of Total So cieties, edited
by Samuel Z . Klausner (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday 1967).
Norbert Wiener, The Hum an Use of Hum an Beings (Gard en City, N. Y .:
Doubleday, 1954).
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starts with the ongm of hominids, two or more million years ago.
Primates became human when they became cultured. They became
cultured biologically when the new brain was able to symbol; they
became cultured technologically when the energy in nature was captured in the form of tools and techniques; they became cultured socially when group-living took on rational rather than instinctual form;
and they became cultured ideologically when they sought explanations
for behavior.
What this means is that, finally, the social sciences are becoming
scientific-and relevant! Oddly enough, some people regard this as
a contradiction. The scientific aspect of physics, or chemistry, or medicine, they say, is obviously relevant, but it is the scientific aspect of
the social sciences which make them irrelevant.14 While the charge is
parti::tlly understandable, especially where depa rtmentalism has succeeded in building almost impermeable walls between and among the
disciplines, nevertheless, I submit that a new relevancy is resulting
from the universalism which is coming.
Part of the evidence for the new relevancy sounds cold and statistical, and therefore irrelevant to some people. Fallout, insecticides, air
and water pollution, population growth, crowding, social unrest, technological innovation, transformation of values, urban pathology, mass
education, rural mentality, the heavy hand of the past, leadership
roles-how can such terms be relevant? Because they deal with the
human condition, not the Western, not the Non-Western, but the human condition! Drop-outs in New York, school-leavers in Lagos,
humanities college graduates in Calcutta are humans caught up in
cultural conditions. Farm mechanization in Iowa, T anzania and
J apan is a technological condition rooted not only in a local cultural
situation but in a universal storehouse of knowledge which knows no
imaginary boundaries. Social mobility, economic opportunity, group
loyalty, vested interests, ethnocentrism, receptivity to new ideas-those
are terms by which cultures are analyzed whether we are dealing with
England, Romania, Syria or Thailand. What I am saying is tha t the
nationalistic social sciences are dead and we ought to insist that they
be buried. As Simon Kuznets has observed: "There is no na tional
physics, chemistry, or biology, and there should be no national economics or sociology."15 And if a universalistic concern for the human
condition cannot be made relevant, on any campus on any continent,
then we clearly are not teachers.
At the risk of boring you, let me indicate just a few of the exciting
findin gs which a universalistic, scientific, systems-analytical approach
is exposing. It is becoming more and more clear that cultures possess
This at least seems to be the argument of Billington, lac. cit., p . 53.
Simon Kuznets , Economic Growth and Development (New York : W . W.
Norton & Co., 1965), p. 91.
14
15
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p eople rather than the reverse. The Black Action Movement, riots in
Wa tts and Chicago, student discontent throughout the world, nationalism, rural conservatism and many other group behaviors are better
understood as reflections of common characteristics which possess
such groups than as simultaneous erratic behavior of a group of unrelated individual wills. It also appears that technology operates on
laws of its own and as it changes it even affects the value system and
social structure. What a valuable concept for studying any culture,
whether Western or Non-Western! It now appears clear that democracy requires a set of historical and social pre-conditions. If this is so,
then what profit is there in condemning states for being non-democratic which have none of the pre-conditions? It now appears clear
that the nation-state can no longer fulfill one of its prime purposes,
namely, the protection and security of its people. As one scholar has
noted, if out-group hate was essential for uniting nations before the
atomic age, some other kind of social conditioning is necessary for the
future. It is clear that exponential curves in technological growth
and population expansion cannot continue. A finite sphere is not infinitely exploitable and it cannot hold an infinite number of anything,
much less people who must have some breathing and living room.
Finally, to use Boulding's useful phrase, it seems clear now that man
is entering an era of post-civilization, with an impact far more swift,
and results far more constructive or far more destructive, than the
era of civilization. I could also point out the overwhelming evidence
that all cultures are biological living systems bound to the natural
world and that, to cite Ames Hawley, " human ecology might well be
regarded as the basic social science." 16
Now it is quite clear that a true universalization of the social
sciences will modify area studies as we have created them. In other
words, the addend um we forced on traditional social science structures becomes obsolete by its success. A true intercultural perspective
will not divide human social systems into neat geographical boxes.
Departments will continue to analyze the particular constellation of
functions which separated them historically, but those functions will
be characteristics of human living systems. Intercultural studies will
be functional not national. They will seek explanations of political or
economic or social behavior in ecological contexts in which the Indian
or Kenyan or Mexican example will be just as appropriate as the
American or French.
Area studies need not disappear, for specialists in depth- with
c0mmand of the necessary language and the minutia of data-will be
necessary. But specialization will be built on the intercultural base and
not in isolated pockets which neglect all other variations. We will
16 Amos Hawley, "Ecology and Human Ecology," Social Forces, Vol. 22,
May 1944, p. 405.
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know we have succeeded in universalizing the social sciences when
institutes for American studies and European studies join the area
programs as adjuncts to the m ain curriculum. T he m ain curriculum
will then treat of universal m an, of an understanding of how human
social systems fun ction a nywhere, of an awa reness of the cultural
determinants of the va rieties of social systems in the world . Area
studies- including American studies- will permit som e specialization
for the educated m an, a specializa tion built on the base of a universal
perspective.
We who are in inter-cultural studies have alread y led the successful attack on departmentalism. D epartments can still exist because
specialists in political, economic, social and historical phenomena a re
still needed. But no longer ca n the political scientist who knows only
the United Sta tes m ake any claim to understanding human p olitical
systems. Without a n understanding of the varieties of political systems
he has no basis even for judging the one he claims to know. But to
understand the variety of political systems, he must also understa nd
the cultural setting in which they occur, not only the local setting
but the universal milieu in which it functions . The sam e is true of the
other depa rtments. Suddenly the picture is clear and frightening:
we have pointed the way, but who among us is qualified to lead ?
This brings me directly to my second recommenda tion for the 1970's.
2. Administrators must be forc ed to defin e the social sciences in the
university.
H aving defended the thesis tha t the social sciences must be universalized, I now must face the uncomfortable fac t tha t professors
h ave neither the ability nor the will to do the job. D epartmentalism
is so entrenched that a professor who attacks it end angers his p rofessional career. L et me illustrate by noting a history depa rtment which
is ra ther proud of its international dimensions. There a re 35 full- time
faculty members in the department. Two of them teach the Soviet
and Baltic a rea, two teach L a tin America, one teaches East Asia a nd
one teaches the Middle E ast. None teach the Pacific a rea, South Asia,
Southeast Asia or Africa, and there a re no courses with a world perspective. The remaining 29 teach W estern Europe and the U ni ted
States! The pa ttern is easily duplicated in other depa rtments and is
probably replicated on all our campuses.
Now the point is that a depa rtment which is overwhelmingly
staffed by Euro-Americanists cannot reform itself of its parochial incest.
Its na rrowly-trained staff can no more think in universal terms collectively then it can individually. Log-rolling tactics seize departmental delibera tions and, with the most serious solemnity, the majority replicates itself in hiring new staff a nd breaks the curricu lum
down into special courses to sa tisfy the peculia r interests of its m ajority
members. Thus a political science department will h ave specialists in
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Euro-American political parties, interest groups, election procedures,
legislative process, executive process, public administration, constitutions, judicial process, public law, municipal administration, municipal law, local government, foreign policy, international relations and
the history of Western political thought. If it is bold it will hire one
political scientist to teach the politics of all Asia, one for all of Africa,
one for all of the Middle East and one for all of Latin America.
Chances are, however, that some continents will be left out even in
this scheme. One chairman of a political science department who had
four specialists on neglected areas ( one on the Slavic area, one on
Southeast Asia, one on South Asia a nd one on Latin America ) out of
20 staff members complained tha t this department was becoming topheavy with people who neglected Euro-American studies! Furthermore, even when a sop is thrown to universalism, the department
still may have no one who deals with politics as a universal characteristic of human societies.
The first pressures for universalizing the social sciences came from
statesmen who were made painfully aware of our cultural ignorance
in World War II. They were joined by natural scientists who were
shocked by the implications of a world made tenuous when the nuclear
age was born. This was followed by the pleadings of a few lonely
scholars in the social sciences (and humanities ) for reform, scholars
who were regarded by their traditionally trained colleagues as a little
odd and possibly even anti-Western if not anti-American. These
scholars have had little impact on most campuses, as we have noted;
but where they have had success, the credit is due equally to administrative personnel who were not shackled to the built-in bias of
departmentalism.
Now we a re getting down to the crux of the issue. A dominant
myth of United States universities is that faculty members ought to
define the university. Furthermore, administrators are regarded as
necessary bureaucra ts who by accepting a deanship or vice presidency
h ave in reality resigned from the intellectual community. Bureaucrats, of course, are to be criticized, m ade fun of, and ignored as much
as possible. I know all of the abuse which is heaped on deans a nd
vice presidents and at one time contributed my share of the criticism.
I now charge that the faculty treatment of administrators is dysfunctional. The dysfunction stems from the fact that solutions to an intolerable situation are effectively blocked by faculty attitudes. Departmentalism proscribes the depa rtments from effective reform and equally proscribes the division of social sciences from defining its proper
role in a university; and conversely, contempt for bureaucrats proscribes the administrators from rectifying the situation.
Some bold voices are beginning to be heard on this problem. John
P ercy Miller, Dean of the Graduate School at Yale, makes the follow91

ing pungent observation, equally applicable to undergraduate as graduate programs:
Guiding the direction of the social sciences within a university poses serious administrative problems. An optimum use of limited resources requires some central direction. Much may be accomplished by encouraging rela ted
departments to develop complementary or reinforcing
strengths. For example, where the economists are strongly interested in economic development, economics, as
well as the other disciplines, will gain strength if political
science, sociology, psychology and history are developed
in ways that reinforce the interest in economic development. If the administration wishes to m aximize the
fruitfulness of its resources, it will not relinquish responsibility for choosing areas of strength to the departments. The administration has a special responsibility
for nurturing developments that fall between departments a nd for coordinating the developments of related
social science disciplines. Needless to say, this requires
the use of the budgetary a nd appointment processes as
tools to implement the broad strategy.17
Equally pungent is the observation a ttributed to Sidney Hook :
Without administrative leadership, every institution, especially universi ties whose faculties are notoriously reluctant to introduce curricular changes, runs down hill.
The greatness of a university consists predominantly in
the greatness of its faculty. But faculties .. . do not
themselves build great faculties. To build great faculties,
administrative leadership is essential.18
Yet a third voice is that of Steven Muller :
Armed above all with the power of the purse, central
administration can rea rrange fossilized acad emic hierarchies; rebuild or abolish weak departments or entire
colleges; create new faculties, departments or interdisciplinary centers; and in general enforce a continuing
review and revision of established academic structure
and performance. At its best, central administration
therefore provides academic leadership of a very high
order, by provoking and promoting self-renewal within
the faculties. At its worst, central administration fails at
this task and allows free reign to the inherent conserva17 John Perry Miller, "New Trends in Graduate Study in the Social Sciences," in Wa lters, Graduate Edu catio n T oday, p. 175.
18 Quoted in William S. Paley, "Structural R eform for Universities,"
Current, J uly 1968, p. 59 .
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tism of faculty establishments that all-too-quickly relapse
into near-feudalism.19
The issue is now clear. As faculty m embers we must cease our
dysfunctional (should I say immoral? ) beh avior in favor of applying
our own systems analysis to the very institution in which we live and
move and have our being. We must cooperate with administrators as
the only method for putting our house in order. W e must, furthermore, demand tha t administra tors assume the obligation thrust on
them. M any administrators are content if relative peace is maintained. Others are reluctant to move because they do not themselves
have a clear vision of the social sciences. This is due partly to the
fact that some administrators a re not trained in the social sciences,
some are too narrowly trained in a particular social science, and some
h ave been ad ministra tors too long and allowed the dynamic developments of the social sciences to by-pass them. Wha tever the reasons,
the challenge of the 1970's is that vice-presidents and deans of the
academic affairs, liberal arts and sciences and graduate schools must
begin to rationalize the social sciences. I can think of nothing which
will support our position more, strengthen the hand of administrators
more, and expose the theoretical weakness of departmentali sm more,
than for every dean to require a written statement from every social
science chairman entitled: "The Role of M y D epa rtment in the Social
Sciences, in the Purposes of a University and in the Liberal Education of Students."
Now it must be clear tha t I am not calling for reform for reform's
sake. I call for a reform that stresses the essence of a scientific social
science, namely, that its base for generalizations must account for all
varia!ion in human history and in all cultures. And I call for a relevancy which stems from a universal awareness of inter-cultural relations from the village and urban level to a world of nation states.
Consideri ng the trends I h ave already outlined above, this call
for reform is not a n idealistic statement of some principle incapable
of fulfillment. The decade of the 1970's will present vast new opportuni ties for new faculty, new curriculums, new fin ancing and new
inter-institutional cooperation. We can close the decade with more of
what we already have or with almost wholly new, and relevant, social
science di visions. Ours is the only theoretical a ttack on the status
quo, and the sta tus quo h as no theoretical justification apart from
the natural accretion of specialized interests. Now is the time to move.
Administrators and fac ulty members who demand tha t the social
sciences become scientific a nd relevant, who demand tha t the definition of the educated m an must include an awareness of the cultural
world, can lift the social sciences to a new and revered place in
universities.
19

Muller, loc. cit., p. 13.
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This leads me to m y third recommendation for facing the future,
a recommenda tion which is bold but I believe responsible.
3. We must begin to train our own p rofessors.
I base this recommenda tion on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the present Ph.D.-granting institutions will not increase
their advanced graduate enrollments enough to meet the demands
of the mid-1970's. This means that they will largely keep or exchange
their own graduates and the rest of us will be left without full y-trained
staff.
The second assumption is that even if the present Ph.D .-granting
institutions produce enough professors to fill our needs, they will still
be trained a5 they have been. One of the causes of departmentalism
is the na rrowness of graduate training. An extreme example of this
is a colleague of m ine who did not have one single course outside
his field of economics between his B.A. and Ph.D. While this case is
extreme, most graduate departments still p ermit study in other d epa rtments only to the extent necessary for strengthening a particular focus.
If undergraduate training were truly universal, this weakness could
be overcome. But undergraduate courses a re a lso overwhelmingly
specialized, which reflects how narrowly the professors were themselves trained. W e cannot universalize the undergraduate curri culum
until we get professors who can and will think in universal terms,
and we cannot get such professors until we train them .
On my campus, our young Ph.D.'s a re almost unanimous in claiming that they know nothing about disciplines other than thei r own.
We h ave great difficulty in staffing such a simple general education
course as M an and Society. And it is almost impossible to staff a course
entitled Introduction to the Non-Western World . If we find a person
trained in Asia politics, he knows nothing about Africa; if t rained in
African history, he knows nothing about Asia; if trained in Middle
East economics, he knows nothing about East Asia or W est Africa.
Now I submit tha t we can train a m an in a universal perspective
without destroying his identification with a pa rticula r department.
S11rely a political scientist can be trained to understand tha t politics
is a universal characteristic of human living systems. Surely an anthropologist can be trained to understand that modern complex societies also have cultures. Surely a sociologist can be trained to understand tha t families are universal and tha t a knowledge of their varieties is as valid as knowledge in depth of a particular form. But the
catch is now apparent: once a potential scholar gets outside his W estern focus, his ad vanced training requires that he understand something
of the total milieu. The political scientist wno wants to know Asian
politics must understand something of the history, the diversity of
family forms, the role of authority, the religions and the technologies
of Asia; and if he wants to include Africa, he must understand yet
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a different constellation of family, a uthority, animistic and tribal forms.
Bu t I submit tha t a training which provides such awa reness can also
produce a political scientist who will be a better political scientist than
one wh o focuses only on the Euro-American systems and has never
been fo rced to comprehend his discipline in its various manifestations.
And the same is true of other disciplines.
I submit further tha t the training can be just as rigorous as in traditional programs, including the theory and methodology of a particula r department. These could be accompanied by seminars with a universal perspective in the m ajor department plus similar seminars in
other departments. Political, economic, sociological, cultural and historical d ata would be presented in universal contexts . Disserta tions
with a broad p erspective can be as valid as ones with a narrow focus.
Why cannot futu re scholars be trained to think in terms as bold as
Boulding's Th e M eaning of the T wentieth C entury or Stevrianos' The
Wo rld S ince 1500 or White's The S cience of Culture? As generalists
these people a re necessarily m asters of specific data and more . But
those who are m asters of specific data only a re merely technicia ns and
ma y or may not become schola rs.
Only when we get professors who are universalists can we hope
to m odify the undergradua te curriculum to serve its former and proper
obj ective : namely, the liberally educated man. Historically, the educated m an was " liberated" as he became aware of his environment, including the physical world, the social world and the world of philosophy, art, litera ture and religion. Historically, also, that world ,was
limited to European cultures. Today the demands for liberation are
just as valid but involve, in Whitehead's phrase, "the whole round
world of human affairs." Only when social science professors view
the whole round world as their proper province will the curriculum
be modi fied so as to impart it to students. To recapitulate, we must
begin to train such professors if we expect to get them . Consequently,
gradua te educati on must be considered here even though the undergraduate college of the future is our main topic.
Furthermore, I see some excellent opportunities for institutional
cooperation in the training of new professors. M ost of the universities
rep resented here are not yet bound to t raditional graduate programs
which characterize the elite universities and we may seriously consider
innovative ways to develop com plementary curriculums and the sharing
of students a nd faculty. W e might even agree to establish panels
from consortium members to administer preliminary examina tions
and the defense of disserta tions. We might even agree to hire each
o ther's graduates to eliminate "inbreeding" which presumably everybody but H arvard abhors.
Now I know the fears rela ted to offering non-traditional doctorates.
I know the reverence which is held for the elite universities. But I sub-
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mit that we are also engaged in the educational enterprise. I submit
that this group of Mid-Western universities concerned with intercultural education has already begun to innovate. We are already moving
away from the traditional. We are alredy challenging the system
which has created the dysfunctional ( and immoral) situation in
which we find ourselves. And we are already engaged in some new
approaches which are as theoretically and as professionally valid as
others.20
I would wish tha t the elite universities would take the lead, since
they harbor the innovators I mentioned earlier. But their innovators
seem to be very lonely. Perhaps our vision, being somewhat removed
from the traditions and politics of these schools, can give us a clearer
perspective of what must be done.
In the beginning, I suggested that the universities do not have
the ability to reform themselves in the matter of providing an intercultural education. I have suggested that the m ain reason is departmental myopia and until that is rectified only piecemeal patches are
possible. But patches will not reform liberal education. I have also
suggested that increased student enrollments, new faculty members,
and possibly new sources of funds offer us some opportunities to try
to innovate . If we try and fail, then dysfunction will have prevailed.
If we do not try, we join the dysfunctionalists.
I have not a ttempted to spell out the details of an intercultural
undergradua te curriculum. Perhaps I should have. But I felt that
the theoretical and scientific problems had to be faced first. I have
tried to be responsible. I would prefer to see some other solutions
which are equally convincing. Perhaps the ensuing discussion will
prove my present conclusions wrong.
20 Note C la rk K err's observation, which is also a d irect ch allenge to us,
that precisely the universities represented here will be the innovators of the
future. "If there are to be new departures," he said, "they are most likely to
come on the campuses of those old, private universities which have prided themselves on control of their own d estiny, and on the totally new campuses of the
sta te universities in America and the new public universities in Britain."
"Conservatism, D ynamism, and the Changing University," in Eurich, op. cit.,
pp. 317-18.
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Science & Technology in Education:
What I(ind of a Marriage Is This?
By

FRANKLIN

G.

FISK

In the 1890's a group of American schoolmen returned from
Europe with degrees of Doctor of Philosophy earned studying with
the disciples of J ohann Friedrich Herbart. Herbart in a preceding
generation had made one of the first attempts at a systematic psychology involving a theory of learning which had obvious pedagogical
applications. The increase in the number of common schools in both
Germany and the United States in the 19th Century had created
many problems. A large number of teachers needed to be trained
and new techniques and strategies of teaching became worthy of serious study. Herbartianism, with its systematic theory and practical
method, seemed ideally suited to meet the needs of schools and teachers of that time. The returning American schoolmen, Charles D eGarmo, the McMurray Brothers and C. C. Van Liew had wholeheartedly
adopted Herbartianism as taught by Zille rand Zein. Upon returning
to the United States these schoolmen began immediately to proselyte
in favor of Herbartianism as a scientific approach to the problems
of education. Among their many activities was the establishment of
the National Herbartian Society which in 1902 became the NSSSE, the
National Society for the Scientific Study of Education. This organization a few years later became the NSSE, the National Society for
the Study of Education. The NSSE, based a t the University of Chicago, is still active today publishing each year two volumes studying in
great detail a part of American education. These American H erbartians were also responsible for the translation and American publication
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of Herbart's The Science of Education.! H erbartianism with its teacher proof technology-the five step method of the recitation involving
preparation, presentation, associa tion, generalization and application
and the curriculum doctrines of concentration and correlation-was
promoted as the scientific solution to the problems of education.
Why did educators turn to science? One reason was not knowing
the answer to many completely novel and pressing problems. Rising
enrollments and a changing composition in the school popula tion had
created intense pressures for change. Moreover, the turn to science
by educators, was also due to the great success of the sciences of
physics, chemistry and biology in the 19th century. The sure knowledge
gained through science in these subj ects was being used to create a
whole system of scientific technologi es, technologies which were responsible for an improved existence. Science was so successful in supporting technology tha t to this day most people consider inventors
such as Edison and Morse as scientists. So educators turned to science
to help establish valid technologies for the schools.
Herbartians were not the only ones who wanted to put education
on a scientific basis. The relation of psychology to education was obvious, in fact, psychology soon came to be considerd the key for a
scientific basis for adequate technologies in education. Edward L.
Thorndike, who received one of America's first Ph.D.'s was a leading
proponent of the scientific approach to the study of psychology and
education. He has been influential, perhaps more than any other single person, in affecting American Educa tion from 1910 to the present.
The results of his psychological research revealed many of the inadequacies of the speculative psychologies of Herbartians, formal disciplinarians, and those believing in faculties residing in the mind. It
was Thorndike who created the oft-quoted educational aphorism,
"We learn to do by doing"-rather than John Dewey-Dewey stated
that we learn from doing, but not from doing alone. Learning by
doing as a pedagogical principle was a direct deduction from the
psychological principles of Thorndike. According to Thorndike these
principles had been established through scientific experimentation.
It is more than coincidental that the Scottish sensationist, Alexander
Bain, under whom Thorndike h ad studied had published a book in
the 1890's entitled, Education as a Science.2
The Education-as-a-Science movement became more respectable
when early in this century the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a section called, Education as a Science.
Today this is Section Q. This section was to be a group for those
1 Herbart, J. F., The Science of Education . (Boston, D. C. H eath, 1902.)
Translation by H enry M . and Emmie Felkin .
2 Bain, Alexander, Education as a Science . (New York, D . Appleton and
Co., 1896.)
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who were interested in studying education in a scientific manner.
At present Section Q has developed into a science-teacher or scienceeducation group and devotes most of its symposia to the problems of
teaching science and not scientific teaching. Many other examples
are available which would show the intense interest during the early
part of the 20th century in making education scientific-in getting
valid technologies-such as the correct answers to what should be
taught and how it should be taught.
What has been accomplished in the past 70 years as a result of
this scientific movement in education to create an adequate technology
of education? Whatever the results, there was far less accomplished
than had ever been claimed as possible. Why the discrepancy between
rhetoric and realization? It is my contention that the claims for
what could be accomplished from a scientific approach to education
have been much greater than what has been accomplished because the
scientific approach to education has not been and is still not scientific.
Reducing pedagogical problems to scientific problems is possible if
one, they are first the type of problem that can undergo a scientific
reductionism, and, two, if the person doing the reduction has an adequate understanding of scientific epistemology and ontology. It is my
contention that most people have not had such an adequate understanding. In supporting my contention I would like to concentrate my
attention upon educational measurement and educational research.
In the past 70 years the Education-as-a-Science movement had its
greatest impact in testing and evaluation, educational research, and
teaching techniques based on psychologies of learning. The failure of
Education-as-a-Science to accomplish all that was claimed comes from
equating measurement with science, collecting facts and analyzing
them into patterns as scientific research, and confusing classroom environments with those in the laboratory. There are to be sure other
mitigating factors which hindered innovation, but if the innovation
was based on misconstrued premises it will surely be handicapped in
its realization. Additionally, part of the present reluctance to innovate
can also be traced to the appearance of one fool-proof panacea after
another with the results being that they were neither fool-proof nor
panaceas. Most of the fool-proof and revolutionary innovations in
education in the past 70 years have been failures. True, there has always been some question as to how wholeheartedly innovations have
been accepted by the schools, e.g., say progressive educational technologies, but yet many innovations were ill-conceived or else failed
to recognize the complexities of the educational environment. That
present innovations are meeting with about the same rate of failure
is not so apparent. The United States Office of Education recently
listed 10 educational innovations in the last decade that were failures.
Among these were team teaching and the nationwide revision of a
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physics course. There are, of course, more than these ten that h ave
been either thwarted or aborted. Read only the perceptive and knowledgeable essays by Anthony Oettinger titled Run, Computer, Run
and The Mythology of Educational lnno vation.3 O ettinger in his
final chapter quotes from John Gardner's No Easy Victories.4 The
quote is:
The roller coaster of aspiration and disillusionment is
amusing to the extreme conservative, who thought the
aspirations were silly in the first place. It gives satisfaction to the left-wing nihilist, who thinks the whole system should be brought down. It is a gold mine for
mountebanks willing to promise anything and exploit
any emotion. But it is a devastating whip-saw for serious
and responsible leaders.
O ettinger follows this quote writing: 5
We have seen tha t educational technology has not reformed-much less revolutionized-education as dispensed in our schools . . . . Numerous economic, institutional, intellectual, and technical barriers account
for this failure . The formal educational system is bound
to society in a way tha t is almost ideally designed to
thwart change. Little substantive technological change
is therefore to be expected in the next decade ( the
'70's) ....
The schools h aven't got any money. Universities, nonprofit creatures of the government, a nd private industry
h aven't got any ideas save the present innovation fad,
which favors highly visible quickie approaches creating
the illusion of progress. No one is able or willing to take
time and risks.
Let us now return to the technology called educational measurement. Since physics was considered to be the most successful of sciences-it followed tha t research should then be modeled after physics.
Since accurate and careful measurement was essential to the progress
of physics, then if you wished to be scientific yo u must be able to
measure carefully and accurately. It is easy to see how accurate
measurement could be equated with being scientific. For some early
commentators in the 20th century, measurement was the only process
by which you know something-if you could not m easure it, it was
impossible to know it. Following this line of reasoning, knowing
means being scientific.
3 Oettinger, Anthony, Run , Computer, Run : The Mythology of Educational Innovation. (Cambridge, M ass., Harvard University Press, 1969.) p . 215.
4 Ibid., p. 215.
s Ibid., p. 215.

100

Perhaps the person most responsible, if responsibility can be assi gned, for this trunca ted view of science was K arl Pearson. His
Grammar of Science6 presented an inadequa te view of the na ture of
science and was unfortuna tely very influential in the Educa tion-as-aScience movement. Since essay examinations were difficult to convert to scaled measurements- the short-a nswer examination with its
objective scoring and essential quantification rapidly took its place in
the schools. A new technology entered American education-a technology purportedly based upon science. I wish to emphasize that this
new technology did not represent any fall from a previous Golden
Age-far from it. But it did not necessarily improve schooling. The
introduction of short-answer examina tions m ay also represent more
than an a ttempt to be scientific since necessity is frequently the
"mother of invention." With risi ng enrollments a nd larger classes it
was becoming impossible to check essay examina tions-so why not
u se short-answer examina tions! With short-answer exami na tions you
could get both a numerical score ( a quantification ) and you could
do it quickly. H ow could anyone lose-you were being both scientific and effi cient a t the same time. Who cared if it was not known
what was measured or what were the essential characteristics of a
valid measuring device.
Physics does involve measu rement, very careful measurement, but
physical measurement is constructed with great care so it is seldom
ambi guous on wha t it is measuring. But accurate measurement is, of
course, not all there is to physics. N evertheless, a clear operational
definition of wha t is measured, a careful determination of whether or
not the measurem ent scale is linear and a careful determina tion of the
amount of error in the measurement h as for the most part been totally
neglected in educational measurement in the schools. T est scores m ay
be numbers but they a re not necessarily measurements. Confusing number with measurement is an all pervading myth in our society. T eaching tha t a measurement is an absolute entity, a point on a scale rather
than a fuzzy indetermin ancy with a n estima ted bounda ry, borders on
the criminal when you start to use test scores as measurements in m aking important decisions. When m a thematics instructors start to realize
tha t a table which measures 12 inches by 12 inches has an area of 140
inches2 a nd not 144 inches2 we might be able to make some progress
on this pervasive confusion. Every measurement carries with it an
error and this error is a n inseparable p art of the measurement. With
no knowledge of the error in a m easurement it cannot be considered a
measurement. I remember well a class taken as an undergradua te. In
this class you needed exactly 263 points to receive a grade of A, no
more and certainly no less. I was awarded 263 points, a good friend,
6

Pearson, K arl, Th e Grammar of S cience. (New York, Charles Scribner's,

1895.)
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262 points-I received an A, he a B. All the points were received from
scores on short-answer examinations. These scores were obviously considered accurate measurements. Yet no one even raised the possibility
tha t these scores did have an error. How much error?-It was probably
of the order of + or - 15 points. This m eant that by using these total
scores and this error one could see a difference in performance only
when the difference in scores was 30 points. It is only incidental, but
poignant, that the department which could see a difference in 1 point
where only a difference existed for 30 points was a department of
physics. I have found that the m any textbooks in educational measurements that I have examined concerning how test scores a re used
in the classroom that instructions concerning the proper handling of
error in a m easurement is completely absent. My own sta ndardized
test which took over two years to produce and was tried on some
8,000 students before being revised and published has an estimated
standard error of + or - five points.7 This means that if two people
have a difference of 10 points in scores on my examination there is a
2/3 chance that this is a real difference but there is a 1/3 chance that
this difference could have h appened by ch ance alone. One cannot
discriminate where a difference does not exist. Banesh Hoffman, a
persistent and sometimes off-base critic of short-answer examination
has not even begun to see the problem associated with error in the
treating of test scores as measurements.8 If test scores are measurem ents, then the errors must be known. If the error cannot be determined then you are not measuring but playing with numbers-a professional numerologist. K epler and the Platonic tradition to the contrary, science is not numerology even if much educational measurement approaches it. When teachers fully understand how measurem ents must be interpreted when the error is considered along with
the test score many want to give up educational measurement altogether. This is indeed unfortunate. An article written within this past
year and published in a British science teaching journal discussed the
problem associated with teachers realizing that their test scores have
an error, in many cases mostly indeterminate.9 What was the writer's solution: it was to keep the teachers uninformed for the present
because if the word was out the teacher would then lose confidence.
This intense need for any technology, however defective, because
of the immediacy of the problems facing teaching a t all levels m ay
well be the most destructive influence we have operating in our schools
7 Anderson, Kenneth E., and Fisk, Franklin G., Anderson-Fisk Chemistry
Test . (New York , H arcourt , Brace and World, Inc., 1968.)
8 Hoffman, Banesh, The Tyranny of Testing. (New York, Crowell-Collier
Press, 1962. )
9 Starr, J. W. , "The Reliability of Exami na tions," Education in S cience .
(February, 1969 ) pp. 23-25.
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today. Rather than say we do not know, we keep up the facade that
we are knowledgeable. How can there be improvement sharpening our
technologies when we completely ignore their inadequacies. That many
technologies a re inadequate as used in the schools is seldom recognized.
Failure to achieve stated goals is usually blamed on the practitioner's
deficiencies or else on some innate or adopted disposition of the pupil.
Measurement is a tricky process and it is especially tricky when it
is being used to measure something that has not yet been measured.
The ob_iectivity of short answer examinations, therefore, is misleading,
especially if the scores are not treated as measurement. Many people
label short answer examinations objective examinations. Since objectivity is one of the characteristics of being scientific then short answer
examinations labeled objective begin to take on the appearance of
being scientific. Even if the classroom teacher considers the error of
measurement, the kind of scale u sed , the identity of what is being measured, he is not necessarily being scientific, only cateful and
systematic.
Another measurement technology presented as having a scientific
basis h as been the use of the Gaussian Distribution as a model for deciding the distribution of grades from a set of test scores. In the language of the student this is known as "curving it." Just why this unjustifiable procedure should still be in existence today is one of the many
small m ysteries of our times. Using short answer examinations and
trea ting the scores as a Gaussian distribution for purposes of assigning
grades is still considered to be a completely fair, objective, and scientific way of testing a nd evaluating in the schools. I can certainly think
of very few more invidious practices than this technique. It is possible
tha t a large number of test scores could arrange themselves in a pattern approximating a Gaussian distribution-but so what if they do!
This only tells you more about the kind of test used rather than how
well the students h ave learned. If test scores are distributed in a Gaussian manner there is still no rational justificatioin that forces one to
decide that the grades have to have a Gaussian distribution . The failure to carefully think about the na ture of a measurement, and an evalu a tion of tha t measurement is surely a contributing factor to the continued existence of a procedure that creates so much despair in the
students. If this is a scientific procedure, then no wonder science
h as an image problem. Science appears as deterministic, mechanical
and unfeeling.
Please know that my criticism of educational measurement is not
an attack on the idea that capabilities and performance cannot be
measured. They can, but the problems associated with educational
measurement, putting it on a sound scientific basis are much more
numerous and complicated than most of us have recognized. The failure to recognize the complexity and difficulty of educational measure-
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ment has certainly contributed to oversimplifying it to the point of
uselessness.
Contributing to the failure of the Education-as-a-Science movement to bring forth a set of valid educational technologies was confusion on wha t was the na ture of the process called science. This con.fusion took two forms, both of which a re rela ted. On the one h and
science is considered to be a strictly inductive process where general
laws appear if one only looks at enough d ata . One must, of course,
look at this da ta objectively, look at it unbiased. According to inductive methodology the observed data m ay exist either in na ture or else
in a laboratory. The laboratory exi sts solely to simplify, to eliminate
va riables, so tha t the order existing in nature will be more readily
apparent. Considering science as induction, once the natu ral law appears in the da ta you h ave a near absolute truth- not completely
absolute- because you m ay h ave made a m istake in your observations
or you m ay have approached the data trying to read into the d ata
certain preconceived p atterns ra ther than letting the d a ta speak to
you- letting the fac ts speak fo r themselves. However, if certain safeguards are established you can very closely a pproxima te the alread y
existing natural rela tionship, the na tural law. In letting the facts
speak for themselves it is permissable, however, if one considers science
to be strictly inductive, to use aids. Such aids a re the use of least-square
a nalysis, the plotting of non-linear d ata on a log-log graph, the use
of analysis of variance and covariance, and fac tor analysis. For those
who consider scientific research to be strictly an inductive p rocess, a
statistical analysis of da ta uncovering the relationships tha t already
exist in the d ata is a necessary technique. In this mode, sta tistical analysis of data becomes a contemporary representation of the Baconian
Inductive M ethod . Those holding tha t science employs only an inductive methodology a re distinctly unhappy with the use of theory.
Theory, to them, is a specula tive intervention used only when the da ta
are not sufficiently clear to speak for themselves. The great m ajority
of researchers in pedagogy and psychology consider science to employ
exclusively an inductive methodology. This has been am ply documented in a valuable disserta tion by Dr. K enneth E. L ake, entitled In ducti ve M ethodology versus H ypothetico-Deductive M ethodology in Educational R esearch.IO Lake shows tha t almost all educational resea rch is cast in the inductive mold with the intense use of sta ti stical
analysis to uncover the rela tionships existing in the d ata. In his study
Lake is very careful to establish wh at would be the m ain features of an
ind uctive methodology, wha t would be em ph asized in such studies, and
what would be considered to be quasi-scientific procedures. U sing this
1 0 L ake, K enneth E ., Ind uctive M eth odology ve rsus H y poth etico -D eductive
M ethodology in Educat io nal R esearch. Unpublished doctora l disserta tion, The
University of K a nsas, Lawrence, 1961.
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established frame of reference Lake shows that the epitome of the
scientific procedure as held in pedagogical and psychological research
is that science is an inductive process. Now one might ask, so what!!
Since science is considered an inductive process and it is found that
educational and psychological research is primarily in the inductive
mode, is this any great discovery? It is if you consider that science
does not employ a strict inductive methodology. Most contemporary
philosophers of science are in almost total agreement that there is no
such thing as an inductive methodology-at least a methodology that
uncovers natural relationships existing in the natural or experimental
data. William Whewell in the 19th century was one of the first to
show that induction-a process by which one proceeded directly from
the particular d a ta to a general law did not in fact exist.I 1 This was
300 years after Bacon had proposed a systematic inductive methodology. Whewell in his criticism of induction asks an essential questionif you are to look at data, which data are you going to look at? There
is a lot to observe in this world and that you pick out one set of data
to gather or record over another shows you have some hypothesis or
inference as to which is best. This analysis by Whewell has since been
called the "Problem of Induction." There exists no formal straightforward inductive logic. Whewell called the general relationship, the
law, an abductive inference, an abduction from or among the da ta.
To a certain degree you force the data to speak in a certain manner.
This is certainly apparent in the work of Galileo and many contemporary scientists. Ca reful accurate data is still important but for a
different reason.
According to Whewell and most contemporary philosophers of
science, generalizations, laws, explanations, are all hypotheticationswhich in order to establish their validity must be subjected to continued testing, testing which attempts to falsify the hypothetication.
Failure to falsify a given hypothetication does not render it true- it
only makes it more acceptable. Just as science is not measurement alone
neither is it only blank minded data sifting for relationships existing
only in the sensate data of the world. Statistical techniques of analysis
create possible, that is, hypothetical relations among the data. A
searching a nalysis of scientific methodologies show that science does
not employ a strict inductive methodology- if it ever did-it is not
even inductive-deductive, but in fact hypothetico-deductive. A hypothetico-deductive methodology places emphasis on the use of theory,
explanations, and hypotheses in addition to generalizations, laws and
accurate data.
If the scientific process does give answers to questions, if the process is a human-operated, human-constructed one, if it is hypothetico11 Whewell, William, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. 1.
(London, John W. Parker, 1847.) pp. 16-46.
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deductive in establishing valid relationships, then a nything short of this
process cannot give adequate answers. Lake in his disserta tion documented that up to 1961 most pedagogical resea rch and those who
write about such research conceive of it as an inductive m ethodology.
If this is so, and if it is granted tha t the inductive m ethodology is a
faulty methodology then the answers from this approach would be
of limited value. That the technologies we a re using in the classrooms,
some of which have been established by research, a re less than useful
is obvious. What is not so obvious is that failure of these technologies
may be in some part a ttributed to faulty science. This is indeed
unfortunate.
In closing, let me say that I do not think that new and adequa te
technologies will automatically a ppea r once all educational research
becomes hypothetico-deductive. Pedagogical a nd psychological questions are very complex: pedagogical research is perhaps the most
difficult kind of research to conduct we have today. Answers will
never be easy to come by-but they will never come in a scientific
manner unless a proper appreciation of the nature of science is realized. False models eventually create a lack of faith in the whole
enterprise. Science as a human activity can help give us answers to
adequate technologies in the classroom, but only if the nature of the
scientific enterprise is properly recognized for wha t it is: A human
approach to the world of sense experience with certain definite but
necessary biases involving the creative use of hypothesis and theory
in conjunction with valid generalizations and accurate da ta . All this is
science, man is a part of it, and I firmly believe tha t science is one
of man's most successful attempts to understand the world in which
he lives.
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The Course Curse
By

DALE PORTER

The course is the backbone of American higher education. Curricula built around sequences or selections of courses are almost universal
in our colleges and universities. Attempts to move outside the course
structure are still regarded as experimental or as exceptions to the rule,
and their achievements are not generally understood unless translated
into the language of course requirements. For example, when students
demanded the opportunity for political involvement in the November
campaigns, university officials obliged them-with a course. When
college teachers think of educational reform they think of changing
the content or the scheduling of courses, or at most the sequence of
courses which makes up the curriculum. They do not question the
course structure itself. Yet the tradition, the habit, the continuing presence of courses acts as a withering curse upon educational reforms
of every kind.
Courses first developed when the transmission of information was
the most important, and the most difficult part of eductaion, that is,
when the teacher possessed the only copy of a valuable manuscript or
the official version of the prevailing truth. The transmission of information can now be mechanized and individualized, yet the medieval
course structure is still with us. Surviving with the course is the equally
archaic myth that a liberal education is achieved by satisfactorily completing a curriculum made up of courses.
There are three general consequences of using such an archaic
structure in higher education, and the curse will not be lifted until
those consequences are recognized. E ach consequence has several ramifications, and virtually all are bad for students. However, each consequence does benefit the people who operate the system, the teachers,
administrators, and staff. Thus when we understand why the system
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fails, we will also understand why it cannot easily be reformed from
within.
The first consequence of the course structure is the inhibition of
learning. The course structure is built upon the assumption tha t all
students learn a t the same pace, regardless of the material to be learned
or the conditions of learning. Tha t assumption is wrong. Students
learn in a non-linea r fashion a t an individual pace which changes
rapidly throughout the day, even by the minute. In courses, therefore,
some students either move ahead of the group (for which they may
be punished ) or lapse into boredom. Other students fall behind. The
middle group of students does both. Interesting lectures do little to
counteract the inhibition of learning, as will be seen later.
Courses imply classrooms, because there is a tendency to assume
that people moving a t the same pace must do so a t the same place;
especially when the pace is determined, not by students but by the
teacher. Finding places-seats and classrooms- for people who attend
courses on a standard schedule constitutes the basic job of university
administrators. It is no good pretending that place-finding is a
special task allotted to only a few. As college and university presidents
know, the search for fin ancial support and the management of the
university community is intima tely tied up with the quest for spaces
--on schedule. The whole operation is insane: we must figure out how
to move several thousand people between several hundred classrooms
and offices, many times a day, five d ays a week. Up to one-half of those
people will move a t the same time. Furthermore, all the people wi ll
arrive on campus, a nd depart, a t the same time of the year. All will
register a t the same time, most will take examinations and d emand
grades at the same time, and many will graduate a nd seek job counseling a nd transcripts a t the same time. As one result, a significant
number of students will select courses not on the basis of what they
want to learn (which, courses being what they are, is probably wise )
but on the basis of class schedules, a rtificial prerequisites, eating and
sleeping habits, and so on. As another result, faculty utilization of
office a nd classroom space and audio-visual resources is incredibly
wasteful. T eachers cannot be assigned classrooms appropriate to their
methods or subject m a tter in many cases, because too many teachers
need the same classrooms at the same time.
The conditions mentioned here are only a sample of what are
everywhere regarded as unavoidable evils and as challenges to ingenuity
by administrators. They are a direct result of the course and classroom
structure. Administrators will not change or challenge tha t structure,
however, because for them it is perfect. It presents a problem in human
analytical geometry, whose variables are not only infinite but also annually renewed, and whose solution is not only impossible but quite
irrelevant to the professed goals of higher education. H ence, the task
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itself cannot be questioned nor the various attempts at completion
evaluated, from the standpoint of educational objectives; and every
a ttempt a t improvement must necessarily result in greater administrative complexity. That is why colleges and universities have special
offices or officers for registration, orientation, room and office assignments, and catalogue revisions.
Most courses either have no stated objectives or have vaguely
worded intentions which change frequently and are unknown to the
curriculum committee after their initial approval; yet invariably graduation requirements are stated in terms of course completions. That arrangement m akes it impossible to find out whether anything is being
accomplished by the curriculum. At the same time, it makes possible
endless administrative m anipulation of the course structure, usually in
the name of reform, without the slightest danger of affecting the overall quality of education.
This does not mean that administrators are Machiavellian hypocrites. On the contrary, it is their very sincerity that makes them
redouble their efforts when the system fails. Administrators can't even
be blamed for the impersonal quality of higher education; lack of personal awareness is inherent in the course concept to begin with. Administrators may make their living from the consequences of the course
structure, but they cannot be held accountable for wha t goes wrong,
because administrative failure is inherent in the course system.
If the course structure is at once so damaging and so rewarding to
administrators, what shall we say of its consequences for teachers ? We
shall say, as our second general contention, that teachers are personally
fulfilled and professionally defeated by courses. Assume for the moment that most any course is a series of regularly scheduled meetings
between a teacher and a group of students (we will see la ter tha t the
apparent exceptions are irrelevant or illusory ) . Group meetings a re
useful for only two educational activities: the development of grouporiented skills, and the distribution or display of individual knowledge
or skill. Most activities carried on by individuals may be carried on in
groups with appropriate changes. For example, group problem solving
differs from individual problem solving in that members of a group
must listen to a nd tolerate each other, seek a consensus, or find generalizations which override the ir individual emphasis. Singing in groups
is different from singing alone.
It would seem that the course structure is admirably suited to the
d evelopment of group-oriented skills in our students. And, except for
the a rbitrary selection of group membership, topics of inquiry, time
and location which courses imply, it is. It is also adaptable to those
displays of skill or knowledge which build confidence in the student a nd
improve his ability to organize and communicate ideas and information.
But the course structure is not often used for these purposes. It is
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used for individual displays of knowledge by members of the faculty.
Displays of knowledge occur under many disguises : as students, we
knew them well. Dissemination of information is the most innocent.
"Socratic questioning" is more subtle but often yields a more impressive display. Discussions a re also useful, whether the teacher dominates
them with his special informa tion or merely exposes the ignorance and
awkwardness of the students. Displays of knowledge by individual students are allowed only with careful restrictions on grounds tha t such
displays usurp time a nd prerogatives of the teacher. Besides, as most
students will blindly affirm, student displays are never as good as
teacher displays.
College faculty, however, do not openly seek these conditions. The
professional ideals a nd myths of American higher education forbid
the a rrogance of power, seeking instead the development of a critical
intellect and an active ethical judgment within each student. W e want
to wake them up, make them think, disturb their confidence. M any
teachers think this way so habitually, in fact, tha t they describe their
classroom activities in terms of accomplishments instead of intentions.
Today they " really shook them with Zeno's paradox" and yesterday
they "drove them to desperation by supporting Eldridge Cleaver all
the way." And so on. This is not just egoism. The fallacy lies in believing that the display of knowledge or the distribution of information is the same thing as the acquisition of knowledge; tha t if one takes
place, the other does, a t the same time. The whole bulk of educational
research for the last fifty years proves the opposi te.
The acquisition of information in usable form is not a group process. It is a n individual task. The individual student perceives a nd
acquires informa tion within the framework and through the ca tegories
of his own experience. You can change that framework with difficulty,
through group experiences of a carefully arranged kind . But you cannot substitute another framework a rbitrarily and still m aintain the ingestion and digestion of information by the student. Yet every effort by
facult y to display knowledge or distribute informa tion in the classroom
(and ma ny times outside the classroom as well ) involves a n a ttempt
to impose an arbitrary framework.
There is a further fallacy apparent in faculty beh avior in the classroom : the belief that displays of knowledge a re the same as the distribution of content information. Every teacher has bad days in the classroom. The students become bored, restless, sleepy. Discussion lags.
Socrates turns over in his grave a t the feebl e di alogues. And you can
guess, in those circumstances, what you would find in the class notes
of your students. The distribution of informa tion has been a failure,
or so it seems.
But what about those memorable days when the h all is hushed
with involvement in your words, when your lecture is a performance
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wo rthy of description by Thomas Mann. Every eye is upon you; furious scribbling a ttests to the impact of your thought upon the notebooks
of your students ; it is a marvelous time! And the distribution of information has still been, professionally, a failure. Wha t has taken place
is a memorable display of kno w ledge. The students have not displayed
their knowledge, so no one can tell what they have learned . Testing
them a t a later da te is irrelevant to the evaluation of the lecture, because
they might have acquired information and ideas in other ways by
then. Even discussions a nd questioning fail to demonstrate that learning has occurred as intended by the teacher, because the teacher seeks
more than mere answers.
I am saying two things: tha t the professed goals of most teachers,
and of liberal education, cannot be reached via the cou rse system with
its classroom consequences; a nd that the attainment of those same
goals by a ny other means cannot be demonstrated in the classroom so
long as the cou rse system survives. This double failure has a double
cause. First, courses systema tically inhibit lea rning by encou raging professorial displays of knowledge to the de triment of group interaction.
Second , courses perpetu a te a morbid fascination with content as an
administrative convenience.
These two causes of faculty failure, like the causes of administrative failure, feed on one another. We have already pointed out that the
course structure is not well suited to the individual acquisition of information. Why not then use it for group inter.action or student displays which reinforce the learning process? Because the course is a
standard unit capable of being administered; and the only process accepted as "educational" which is also capable of being formed into
standard units is the distribution of informa tion, or the display of
knowledge, by the teacher. By a variation of P arkinson's Law we can
say tha t subj ect matter either expands or contracts to fill the time
alloted to it. Not so with group interaction of the kind which develops
intellectu al and other skills. The development of group-oriented skills
cannot be arbi trarily cut off by the end of a class period or a course
without endangering the whole enterprise, and in some cases, the
emotional stability of the students themselves. Subj ect ma tter, on the
otQer hand, m ay be distributed on a ny basis whatsoever, because the
mode of distribution is irrelevant to the mode of acquisition and
digestion.
M any exceptions m ay be offered to the rule of content-dominated
courses, but they are, after all, exceptions. The dominan t tendency in
the course structure h as to be towa rd the distribu tion of informa tion .
Such a tendency forces many group-oriented operations out of the
classroom, and forces m any individualistic discovery processes, such
as laboratory work, into the classroom mold . There is no special value
in having a whole group of students p erform experiments in the same
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room at the same time if those experiments a re aimed a t developing
individual skills. The availability of the teacher may be more hindrance
th,m h elp in tha t situa tion because it tends to p erpetua te the students'
reliance upon authority. Besides, the a ttempt to schedule individual
learning is futile.
Since the course structure inhibits any other activity we should not
be surprised to find faculty distributing subject m atter. But as in the
case of administration, the course structure not only defeats the intentions of those who operate it, but rewards them a t the same time in
ways which tend to perpetuate the problem. The course system rewards teachers by providing them with regula r audiences for their
displays of knowledge. In other words, the most powerful motivation
for lea rning academic subj ects is systema tically reserved for the teacher- not the student. T eachers often admit to the ego-boosting effects
of the classroom experience; they can do so with impunity because
they believe tha t such rewards a re compatible with the a ttainment of
their educational goals. There is not a shred of evidence to show that
brilliant displays of knowledge enhance the distribution of informa tion
- tha t the inspired lecturer "teaches" better than the dull one-but
the effect of a good perform ance is usually an ego-satisfyi ng reaction
from the students. And why not ? Given a choice between two equally
irrelevant classroom experiences, most people would choose the more
entertaining one. After years of such experiences both teacher a nd student have come to believe that the quality of the fac ulty display of
knowledge determines the quality of education . Faculty, therefore
work very conscientiously to upgrade the quality of their displays,
whether lecture or lab, and in so doing they strengthen the system
which is defeating their goals. Moreover, most faculty cooperate fully
with administrators to perpetua te a bias toward subj ect ma tter even
when they are aware that this bias is detrimental. They can't see that
a subject-matter orienta tion in the classroom is endemic to the course
system.
By this point the thi rd major consequence of the course system
should be clear. In pa rallel with the teacher a nd the ad mi nistrato r,
the student is both defeated by the process of rewards, and rewarded
in the process of defeat.
The student is rewarded for attending class according to the course
schedule. He is rewarded for apprecia ting fac ulty displays of knowledge, especially those which distort the distribution of inform ation. H e
is rewarded for displaying his own knowledge in a manner obviously
inferior to tha t of his teacher. As we h ave seen, all of these activities
tend to defea t the goa ls professed by the teacher, which the student
is assumed to sha re. If the student takes the p rofessed goals too seriously, or acknowledges his rejection of them, he finds both fac ulty and ad112

rmmstration working against him. Thus he too is caught up in the
wretched paradox of American education.
The process of rewarding activities detrimental to liberal education
is a natural consequenct of the course structure. Since the structure is
based on, and encourages, displays of knowledge and the distribution of
information on a standard schedule, only these activities can be accur
ately measured within the system. All other measurements are purely
arbitrary: that is, whatever else is measured has little or no relevance
to the kinds of activity permitted or encouraged in courses. This includes activities outside the classroom, such as reading and writing
assignments. The student, then, is tested for and granted credit for
his ability to do that which his particular course, and the whole course
system, tries to inhibit. He is asked periodically to display his knowledge and distribute information.
But there are further inconsistencies. In most examinations the
student is asked to proceed in a manner which most teachers would
find intolerable. The display of knowledge or skills is restritced by the
audience, channelled into arbitrary, fragmented forms, and further
inhibited by boundaries of time, place, and personal involvement chosen for their administrative convenience. To top it all off, the content
and procedure for the examination are secret. The student may be told
what the examination will "cover," but he is seldom told what the
correct responses will be, or even what type of response is considered
correct.
The result is that the student knows how a teacher displays knowledge and how a teacher asks questions, but not how a student displays
knowledge. He will not find out how to behave like a good student
until after his final examination, when his performance is evaluated.
Even then he cannot be sure how to correct his deficiencies. This is
also true of writing assignments for the most part. Since subject matter
is of prime importance, considerations of style tend to be ignored except in the English department. The schedule-bias of the course system leads faculty to assign and receive writing assignments in periodic
heaps, making helpful responses difficult. The student's performance,
rather than his progress, then becomes the focus of attention and evaluation. That's why seniors in college read and write only slightly better than they did in the twelfth grade.
Because the curriculum of courses demands and rewards a kind of
schizophrenia it is not surprising that students develop their most useful
skills in extra-curricular activities. How do you act like a student? The
professor won't tell you but other students will. And if the professor
is shocked at the cynicism of the advice on courses exchanged among
students, he must be ignorant of the fact that the type of behavior
testable and rewardable in the course structure is not the kind of behavior he professes to desire from his students.
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Students understand very early in life how the system works. My
six-year-old wrote for his mother a random series of numbers, and
insisted that she circle several numbers even when she failed to discern a patterned relationship between them. These "answers" were
then compared with an equally arbitrary set of answers on his own
paper and pronounced incorrect, simply because they did not match!
When questioned about this procedure, he responded with a principle
which operates from first grade to Ph.D. programs: " If your paper
does not match the teacher's paper, it's wrong."
The arbitrariness of the system reflects the degree to which behavior
desired by teachers a nd administra tors is inhibited by the course structure. Teachers perversely try to reward imagination, sensitivity, thoroughness, and other qualities whose identification and evalua tion is
entirely subjective; while students perversely insist u pon conforming
to patterns of behavior tha t can be identified and measured within
the course structure. The strange result is tha t few people in the system are credited with distinction even though most people display an
amazing degree of resourcefulness, imagination, determina tion, p atience, and compassion just trying to cope with it. There is a lesson
here about misdirected energy.
I do not want to argue about the thousands of exceptions which
might be offered to the situa tion described above. In a university with
a curriculum of courses, as in any bureaucracy or system of laws, the
real action occurs between the lines of definition . The danger lies in
thinking that the action is a response to anything within the structure.
The work of the teacher and administrator in the course system is
best expressed by the Arab proverb, "The dog barks- the caravan
passes."
The fact that the caravan moves at all in American universities
is due mostly to the ingenuity of students in ferreting out the things that
count and preparing themselves to be counted. If we ever redefined
the things that count in terms of the professed objectives of liberal
education, or, to the same end, redefined the professed objectives in
measurable terms, the students would undoubtedly apply the same
effort and ingenuity to the program.
Why don't we let that happen?
I suggest we don't let it h appen for three reasons, each of which
points to an uncertain future for higher education in America. I n the
first place, as I have tried to show, people involved in the course
structure are rewarded for failing in their professed goals. Every
attempt at correcting the failures, moreover, only m akes things worse.
Because the course structure is dysfunctional at all levels, each group
tends to blame the others for its own misfortunes. There are calls for
increased participa tion in everybody else's decision-making, and the
structure escapes serious criticism in the ensuing confusion. This situ-
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ation will continue developing until legislators and patrons refuse further subsidies. There are signs of such a revolt even now, and it isn't
due just to rioting students.
The second reason why educational goals will not be redefined in
measurable terms, is the traditional assumption that courses do meet
those goals in an undefined but unquestionable fashion. As I pointed
out before, the paradoxes of the course structure make it impossible to
measure progress of any sort. So no one can prove or disprove the assumption that courses do their job.
One might raise a question, however. If a bright student should
develop and manifest the desired abilities before meeting all of his
course requirements, could he be considered educated? In most colleges and universities, the answer is no. The final degree demands the
same number of credits from every student (except for waivers based
on non-educational premises). If students cannot even stay together in
one class period, how can they reach the desired overall goals at precisely the same time? The answer is obvious, the requirements are all
that can be reasonably expected of an average student, engaged "full
time," for four seasons with the course structure. Students who learn
quickly can be given more subject matter for "enrichment."
Escaping from such tautological reasoning is difficult since it requires both a sense of humor and a whole new perspective. In order to
state educational goals in measurable terms, for instance, one must take
the following preliminary steps:
1) Stop thinking about courses ( that's like: stop thinking
about the opposite sex).
2) Distinguish your ideals from reasonable expectations.
3 ) Get rid of the notion that the fulfillment of your goals
involves a mysterious element susceptible only to intuitive
judgment.
4) Get rid of the notion that you know best how to reach
the objectives you set.
5 ) Prepare to grant credit, or a degree, whenever a student fulfills your objectives, not sooner or later.
Few people already involved in the course structure can make
such changes without great personal difficulties. People outside the
structure, such as businessmen, have less trouble defining traditional
educational goals in terms of measurable objectives; and they are already getting rich by contracting to do what public schools cannot
do, on a money-back guarantee basis. Within ten years they will be
threatening the jobs of university faculty and administrators who find
the personal rewards of the course structure more compelling than its
objective failures.
The final reason why university personnel may hesitate to clarify
their professed goals is the enormity of the possible consequences. Hu-
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man nature has a way of qualifying even the most radical reforms, but
if administrators can be prevented from standardizing procedures, students will find effective, cheap, non-bureaucratic ways of fulfilling the
new objectives. Faculty may keep their status ( and their jobs ) only by
becoming more ingeniously helpful to students than anyone else. Most
of the efHuvia of the course structure, which includes dormitories and
faculty office buildings, will disappear. So, for most of the time, will
students.
The consequences of the course structure of higher education may,
in fact, be preferable to the consequences of actually achieving its
goals. And not only for those who now operate the universities . Who,
after all, is ready for a whole generation of liberally educated people?
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